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ABSTRACT
Management teams in real estate firms are in a precarious position as they struggle to
manage innovation without much experience in planning and executing technology-
driven strategies. Real estate technology is in its infancy. The growth trajectories of
innovations and the impacts of novel technologies on the future of the real estate industry
have yet to be seen. This is an important time for board members and senior managers of
leading real estate firms because innovation is a double-edged sword. A sound
technology policy can be highly lucrative, while a failed technology strategy can prove
positively fatal.
This thesis studies the complexities of managing innovation in the real estate industry. It
builds on the study of innovation and strategic management in other industries to provide
insight into the future of the real estate industry. Managing innovation is not a new
problem - there is a significant body of scholarship on the topic that has been developed
through rigorous study of several industries ranging from disk drives to retailing.
Researchers have produced a set of analytical frameworks and detailed case studies that
explore the interaction between innovation and firm-level strategic management. This
paper applies some of these analytical tools to study the nature of innovation in the real
estate industry and uncover potential opportunities and pitfalls facing managers in the
future
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Introduction. The Challenge of Innovation
"All progress is initiated by challenging current conceptions, and executed
by supplanting existing institutions. " George Bernard Shaw'
Managers of successful firms are today facing challenges that would have been
unimaginable to many of their predecessors a decade ago. The advent of information
technology and electronic commerce has brought with it a significant paradigm shift in
the business world.2 Innovation has now, more than ever become synonymous with
success. There is no shortage of examples of "New Economy" investors richly rewarding
innovative firms and harshly punishing firms that are either unable or unwilling to adapt
their business models to capture value from change.3 As a result, management teams are
under intense scrutiny from shareholders to identify and capitalize on new market
opportunities arising from technological innovations. Technology-driven strategic
management is no longer confined to "high-tech" areas like the software, biotechnology,
and consumer electronics industries. Established firmnns in mature industries such as
banking, retailing, transportation, and health care are increasingly focused on building
their competitive strategies around technological innovations. 4 In this environment,
1 Quote was taken from an online collection of George Bernard Shaw' s quotes. The quote itself can be
found in "Man and Superman":
2 H. Mendelson and J. Ziegler, Survival of the Smartest: Managing Information for Rapid Action and World
Class Performance (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1999).
3 A recent example of this phenomenon is the story of Border's Books, whose stock price has been
languishing despite the fact that it is the most profitable retail bookseller in the industry. Investors have
been punishing the company because of its inability to sell books online. For further information, see
"Retailing in the Age of the Web, a Book Chain Flounders," The Wall Street Journal, 2/22/99.
4 See Forbes, February 2000, 'The Evolution of Business", and Fortune, "Strategies for the Millennium,"
January 2000, and The Wall Street Journal, "The Collapse of Sears," March 14, 2000.
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innovation has evolved from a source of competitive advantage to a basis for survival as
firms strive to meet and exceed the technological advances of their counterparts.5
Managers in the real estate industry have certainly not overlooked the awesome
strategic significance of technological innovations. The management teams of public real
estate firms, fueled as they are by shareholder demands and public scrutiny, are directing
an increasing amount of time and resources to develop sound strategies for innovation.6
That innovation is currently a 'hot topic' for industry analysts and participants and is
reflected in the fact that major industry associations such as the Urban Land Institute, the
International Council of Shopping Centers, the Building Owners and Managers
Association, and the National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts, have been
holding a growing number of regional and national conferences dedicated to technology
and its effects on real estate.7 The trade publications (Urban Land, Shopping Centers
Today, National Real Estate Investor, Homebuilder, and Multifamily Investor) have each
featured at least one article on technological innovation in more than 80% of their issues
since January 1999.8 New publications and websites on real estate technology are
sprouting up at an impressive rate according to Peter Pike, whose website, Pikenet, is the
leading Internet news source for the real estate industry and lists well over 200 different
5 The emergence of online stock brokerages presents an excellent case study. For example, see Merrill
Lynch's struggle to develop an online business, such as "Merrill's E-Battle," Business Week, 11/15/99.
6 This information is drawn from an industry panel report entitled "The Real Estate Landscape in 2000-
Challenge and Opportunity," Industry Report, Deutsche Banc Alex. Brown, June 15, 2000.
7 Promotional material sent to the authors directly from these organizations. For further information, see
the association websites: www.uli.org for Urban Land Institute, www.icsc.org for International Council of
Shopping Centers, www.nareit.org for National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts, and
www.boma.org for Building Owners and Managers Association.
8 Information gathered by authors. Several minor trade publications, such as regional newspapers and
magazines have also featured several articles on technology.
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news websites reporting real estate content.9 The mainstream business media is tracking
the impact of information technology in the real estate industry as well. As of July 2000,
The Wall Street Journal has printed five feature articles and more than 30 coverage pieces
about technology developments in the real estate industry.10 Management scholars, real
estate consultants, and managers from leading firms agree that the industry is ripe for
large-scale innovations within the next five years.l
The fact still remains, however, that the real estate industry is not a 'technology-
intensive' business. The link between real estate and innovation is not as straightforward
as in other industries that have traditionally relied on technological innovations to
produce new generations of products and services. Although the industry clearly
perceives that innovation is significant, the reality is that technological innovations have
not yet directly and significantly affected the functions and operations of most real estate
firms.12 The CEO of a major international brokerage firm commented that to his brokers,
technology is nothing more than, "e-mail, cellular phones, computer terminals, and
wires."'3 When asked about the impact of technology on the development of strip
shopping centers, a Vice President of the largest private retail development firm in
9 See Pikenet's website, www.pikenet.com for further information.
10 The Wall Street Journal, dates of featured articles, 7/8/99, 4/26/00, 5/4/00, 6/6/00, 7/17/00, see
bibliography for full references and citations of coverage pieces.
"Face-to-face Interviews by the authors with Professor Jim Short of the London Business School and
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Sloan School of Management, and Andrew Florance, CEO, Costar
Group at the MIT Disintermediation Forum, 5/12/00, and James Hime, CEO, tenantcity.com, 5/27/00, and
excerpts from published interviews with Chris Peacock, CEO Jones Lang Lasalle, and Jeffrey Bucksbaum,
CEO General Growth Properties, see bibliography for further references.
12 Telephone interviews with employees from Colliers International (4/3/00 through 5/1/00), Boston
Properties (9/28/99), and The Kutzer Company (1/18/00), a commercial property management firm in Los
Angeles.
13 Face-to-face interview with John McLernan, CEO, Colliers, Macaulay, Nichols, Inc., 5/3/2000.
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Illinois commented, "We don't have a concrete technology policy... We just build to the
specs of the retailers."' 4
Management teams are in a precarious position as they struggle to manage
innovation without much experience in planning and executing technology-driven
strategies. Real estate technology is in its infancy. The growth trajectories of
innovations and the impacts of novel technologies on the future of the real estate industry
have yet to be seen. This is an important time for board members and senior managers of
leading real estate firms because innovation is a double-edged sword. A sound
technology policy can be highly lucrative, while a failed technology strategy can prove
positively fatal.
This thesis is about managing innovation in the real estate industry. It builds on
the study of innovation and strategic management in other industries to provide insight
into the future of the real estate industry. Managing innovation is not a new problem -
there is a significant body of scholarship on the topic that has been developed through
rigorous study of several industries ranging from disk drives to retailing. Researchers
have produced a set of analytical frameworks and detailed case studies that explore the
interaction between innovation and firm-level strategic management. This paper applies
some of these analytical tools to study the nature of innovation in the real estate industry
and uncover potential opportunities and pitfalls facing managers in the future.
14 Interview with Norris Eber, Vice President, Joseph Freed and Associates, 5/23/2000.
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The first chapter presents some of the latest academic scholarship on managing
innovation. The focus of this chapter is on the theory of "disruptive technologies," 15 a
state-of-the-art theory, which explores how and why certain types of innovations have the
power to change the competitive landscapes of strong industries and destroy the positions
of market leaders.16 The basic principles of the theory originate from the study of 'high-
tech' firms by management scholars Richard Foster, Rebecca Henderson, Kim Clark,
Richard Rosenbloom, and Clayton Christensen.' 7 Recently, the focus of research on
disruptive technologies has expanded to include several 'low-tech' industries such as
health care and banking, which are not technologically dissimilar to the real estate
industry. The review of the research is then used to build an analytical 'innovation
framework' based on the principles of disruptive technologies.
Chapter 2 considers technological innovations in the real estate industry from the
perspective of the theories presented in chapter 1. To facilitate discussion of recent
innovations in the broad and diversified industry, analysis is grouped among one of three
functional sub-sectors: service, construction, and owner/developer. Service firms are
companies that are engaged in the brokerage, lending, professional services, and property
management functions. The construction grouping includes architectural, engineering,
and construction companies. The owner/developer group consists of public and private
firms that act as principals in the ownership and development of commercial and
15 Also called "disruptive innovations" and "discontinuous technologies".
16 See Richard J. Foster, Innovation: The Attacker's Advantage (New York: Summit Books, 1986), and
Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1997).
17 See Works Cited section for full citations on some of these scholars' works.
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residential real estate. Innovations in each of the sub-sectors are analyzed using the
innovation framework developed in the first chapter.
In the third chapter, the innovation framework is used to analyze the retail
development sub-sector of the real estate industry. This section consists of a detailed
review of technological innovations in retail development over the past 70 years. The
analysis begins with the development of downtown shopping districts and includes
famous innovations like the suburban strip shopping center, the regional mall, the power
center and the outlet center. The review concludes with a discussion of electronic-
commerce as a disruptive technology for retail real estate developers.
Chapter 4 analyzes the technology initiatives of the Simon Property Group, the
nation's leading retail development firm. Building on the analysis from the previous
chapter, this section focuses on the actual policies of one of the real estate industry' s most
respected and innovative management teams. A number of Simon's major technology
initiatives are dissected and evaluated using the innovation framework in order to
understand how the firm perceives the industry landscape and how they plan to retain
their leadership position.
Thus, the analysis telescopes downward through the second, third, and fourth
chapters from real estate on the industry level (chapter 2), the industry sub-sector level,
(Retail - Chapter 3), and the firm level, (Simon Property Group - Chapter 4).
10
The conclusion ties the lessons from the first four chapters together and considers
the applicability of the innovation framework approach to real estate. It summarizes what
we have learned by studying real estate from a technology perspective. The thesis
concludes with some suggestions about further research on the topic.
The next section presents the methodology used in conducting the research for
this thesis.
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Methodology
Real estate management is a field of study that has not yet developed a large body
of technology-focused academic literature. This thesis approaches the problem of
managing innovation in real estate by developing an analytical innovation framework
based on existing academic literature drawn from the study of other industries and
applying that framework to the real estate industry. In order to provide sufficient depth
and breadth to the analysis, the framework is first applied across the entire industry, then
to the retail development sub-sector, and finally to the leading firm within that sub-sector.
The idea behind this layered approach is to suggest how a leading firm in the real estate
industry might approach the problem of innovation - by studying the impacts of new
technologies on other industries, by considering innovations in other parts of the real
estate industry, and by looking carefully at the role of innovation in the firm's specific
line of business. The research for this thesis consists of information gathered from books,
case studies, articles, and both face-to-face and telephone interviews conducted by the
authors.
Innovation Literature
The literature used to construct the innovation framework was principally based
on the research conducted in two important books on managing innovation, Innovation:
The Attacker's Advantage, and The Innovator's Dilemma. s8 These works presented
important milestones in the study of innovation management and spawned several
18 See Richard J. Foster, Innovation: The Attacker's Advantage (New York: Summit Books, 1986), and
Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1997).
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academic articles and case studies on innovation issues from a wide range of industries.
In the first chapter, these articles and case studies are employed to flush out the major
components of modem innovation theory and provide some real-world examples of the
impacts of innovation.
Real Estate Industry
The research for the real estate industry primarily consists of articles and
interviews conducted by the authors. Articles were gathered from mainstream business
media and trade publications in both print format and electronic format. Three websites
were particularly helpful in providing articles on technology matters in the real estate
industry: www.wsj.com, the online edition of The Wall Street Journal;
www.pikenet.com, the leading source for real estate news on the Internet; and
www.icsc.org, the official site of the International Council of Shopping Centers. Each of
these websites provided several articles from the past and present that were used to sketch
the portrait of innovation in the real estate industry. The numerical data used in Chapter
3 was collected from a variety of sources including the International Council of Shopping
Centers, the Urban Land Institute, the United States Department of Commerce, and the
United States Treasury. The authors interviewed managers from real estate fnns
engaged in ownership, management, development, brokerage, construction, lending,
online services, and real estate finance. Thirty individual interviews were conducted in
person, by phone, and by email. Twenty interviews were conducted in person at two
industry events: the Real Estate Services Disintermediation Forum held at MIT on May
12, 2000, and the International Council of Shopping Centers Spring Convention held
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from May 23 through May 27, 2000, in Las Vegas, Nevada. Another ten interviews were
conducted in June and July of 2000 through telephone conversation and electronic mail.
Interviewees were asked to share their opinions about which innovations have most
impacted the real estate industry and their experiences with specific innovations that
impacted their markets. Five interviews with experts from outside the real estate industry
helped round out the analysis with some unique perspectives on how innovations change
business models within firms and across industries.' 9 The articles and interviews
together provide a preliminary understanding of the nature of innovation in the real estate
industry.
Analytics
The analysis that results from applying the theories of innovation to the real estate
industry is entirely original. It is not intended to be a definitive approach to the topic, just
a fresh look at the nature of innovation in real estate. Market realities are rapidly
changing and with the growing significance attached to innovation by managers of real
estate firms, we can expect an upsurge in this kind of research in the future. A major
motivation behind this thesis is to encourage further study into the field of innovation by
future scholars of real estate management.
With that aim in mind, we proceed with the first chapter and an analysis of
modern theories of innovation.
19 Specifically, face-to-face interviews conducted by authors with management professors Jim Short of
London Business School (5/13/00) and Henry Chesbrough of Harvard Business School (10/12/99), and
venture capitalists Vishnu Menon of Accel Partners (1/14/00) and Andrew Van der Laan of Credit Suisse
First Boston (2/10/00).
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Chapter 1. The Art of Managing Innovation
Innovation is widely regarded by economists as the fundamental driver of long-
run economic growth and the primary determinant of increasing standards of living.2 0
For students of management, however, innovation is a powerful and unpredictable force
that often challenges the accepted principles of sound management. 21 The growing field
of managing innovation started in the mid-1980s with studies on competition during the
evolution of the computer industry from the late seventies to the early nineties.2 2 This
period stands out in the history of business as one of the most remarkable displays of the
power of technological innovation - every new technology brought with it a new set of
leading firms that quickly displaced the existing leaders and, in turn, were quickly
displaced by the next generation of leading firms touting a new technology. 23 This
frenetic pace of change inspired management scholars to explore the relationship between
technology and management strategy. From the earliest work in the field, researchers
sought to understand the destabilizing effects of innovation - why certain innovations
break down existing market systems and cause the failure of leading firms.2 4 Recent
studies have continued to explore the destabilizing effects of innovation and expanded the
20 For an economic perspective on the significance of technological innovation, refer to the work of Robert
Solow, a Nobel-prize-winning economist from MIT. The "Solow-Swan growth model" identifies
technology as the fundamental source of gains in labor and capital productivity, which together determine
the long-run rate of economic growth. See Robert M. Solow, Growth Theory: An Exposition (London:
Oxford University Press, 2000).
21 See Richard J. Foster, Innovation: The Attackers Advantage (New York: Summit Books, 1986).
2 This definition of the field is drawn from the introductory lecture to a course entitled "Managing
Innovation" that was taught by Professor Henry Chesbrough at the Harvard Business School in fall of 1999.
23 For a fascinating and detailed history of the evolution of the disk drive industry, see Clayton M.
Christensen, "The Rigid Disk Drive Industry: A History of Commercial and Technological Turbulence,"
Business History Review (67), Winter, 1993, 531-588.
24 See the introduction to Foster, note 20 above.
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research to a wide array of industries from the manufacturing and service sectors. 25 This
chapter explores some of the latest research in the field and presents an analytical
'innovation framework' that is used in later chapters to study the real estate industry.
It is helpful to define some basic terminology before proceeding with an analysis
of the literature. 'Technology', as used in this thesis, means the processes by which a
company "transforms labor, capital, materials, and information into products and services
of greater value."2 6 Every type of firm has a technology or a set of technologies. A
retailer like Sears uses a particular technology to purchase, present, sell, and deliver
products to its customers, while a discount warehouse like PriceCostco employs a
different technology.2 7 The term 'innovation' refers to a shift or change in a technology.
Innovations are either 'radical' or 'incremental', based on the degree to which the new
technology resembles its predecessor.
Why Market Leaders Fail
Most recent theories about why great companies fail are drawn from research on
the manufacturing sector and can be categorized as either 'organizational theories' or
'capabilities theories'.28 Organizational theories suggest that leading firms are not able to
capitalize on new technologies when these innovations call for major changes in firm
organization and management structure. In their study of manufacturing firms, Kim
25 See H. Kent Bowen, Kim B. Clark, Charles A. Halloway, and Steven C. Wheelwhright, "Make Projects
the School for Leaders," Harvard Business Review, September-October 1994, 131-140.
26 See Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma (Boston: Havard Business School Press, 1997)
15.
27 Ibid., xiii.
28 This distinction is drawn by Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma, 12-13.
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Clark and Rebecca Henderson find that because most leading firms base their
organizational structures on the architecture of their dominant products, firm structures
facilitate component-level innovations instead of product-level innovations.29 Thus,
when faced with an innovation that changes product architecture, the firm is not able to
adapt its management structure fast enough or well enough to capture the opportunity.
Capabilities theories argue that leaders fail when they encounter certain 'radical'
innovations that are not well suited for the firm's core technological competencies. In his
study of the history of the auto industry, Clark discovers that leading firms build
technological capabilities incrementally and based on their experience with a particular
product or service.30 When these firms are confronted with innovations that call for new
competencies, they are unable or unwilling to develop the technical 'know-how' required
to bring such products to market.31
In his landmark study on the impacts of innovation on several different industries,
Clayton Christensen finds that neither organizational theories nor capabilities theories are
sufficient to explain the failure of leading firms.32 The leading firms in his study had
flexible management structures, broad technological capabilities, and were commended
by analysts as standard-bearers of management excellence. "What this implies,"
Christensen points out, "is that many of what are now widely accepted principles of good
29 Auto manufacturers are typically organized around their products - engine department, transmissions
group, electronics team, etc. See Rebecca M. Henderson and Kim B. Clark, "Architectural Innovation: The
Reconfiguration of Existing Systems and the Failure of Established Firms," Administrative Science
Quarterly (35), 9-30.
30 See Kim B. Clark, "The Interaction of Design Hierarchies and Market Concepts in Technological
Evolution," Research Policy (14), 1985, 235-251.
31 See Philip Anderson and Michael Tushman, "Technological Discontinuities and Dominant Designs,"
Administrative Science Quarterly (35), 1990, 604-633.
32 Christensen, xviii.
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management are, in fact, only situationally appropriate."3 3 Each of the firms studied by
Christensen invested in research and development, stayed close to their customers,
planned well and worked hard to build their leadership positions among fierce
competition. He argues that these great firms failed because of their inability to capture
value from "disruptive technologies," or simple innovations that give rise to cheap
products or services that initially cater to lower tiers of the market but eventually grow to
capture mainstream customers.3 4
The theory of disruptive technologies is an analytical framework consisting of
three interdependent notions: the notion of disruptive technologies, the notion of
performance overshooting, and the notion of value networks. Each of these notions is
briefly described below using analytical tools developed by Christensen and other experts
in the field of technology strategy. The presentation of the theory is followed with an
illustrative example of the impact of innovation on the retail industry.
Disruptive and Sustaining Technologies
Most innovations within a given industry improve the performance of established
products and services along the specific measures of performance that mainstream
customers in significant markets consider valuable. Christensen terms these innovations
"sustaining technologies" because they sustain the existing dimensions of product
performance.3 5 Sustaining technologies can be radical or incremental, based on the
differences between the new technology and its predecessor. Some examples of simple
18
33 Ibid., xii.
34 Ibid., x.
sustaining technologies are: lead-free pencils (incremental), ready-made meals at the
local supermarket (incremental), longer-lasting batteries (radical), and faster computer
processors (radical). Disruptive technologies, on the other hand, "bring a very different
value proposition to the market than was previously available."3 6 A disruptive innovation
measures different attributes of performance than those relevant in established markets.
Almost always simpler and cheaper versions of existing innovations, disruptive
technologies under perform established technologies in mainstream markets, but have
features that are valued by new customers in emerging markets. Examples of disruptive
counterparts to the sustaining innovations listed above are: mechanical pencils, web-
based supermarkets, solar-powered appliances, and palm-held computers. These are
disruptive technologies because they offer customers new criteria from which to judge
product performance - electric vehicles don't accelerate as well as gasoline vehicles, but
they are more friendly to the environment; online supermarkets don't offer as wide a
range of products as conventional supermarkets, but they are more convenient; solar-
powered flashlights are not as reliable as battery-powered flashlights, but they are
cheaper to own and operate; and palm-held computers are not as powerful as desktop
computers, but they can fit in your pocket. Thus, the distinction between disruptive and
sustaining technologies is a market distinction more than a technical distinction. The
following figure helps visualize this distinction.
35 Ibid., xi.36 Ibid., xii.
19
Figure 1. Disruptive Technologv S-Curves
Mainstream Market Application A
Technology Curve
Exi:
Emerging Market Application
Technology Curve
New
Time Time
Source: C.M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma, p.4041
The graph above contains three technology S-curves, which measure performance
increases over time. S-curve theory, which is an analytical tool used by scientists to
predict the performance of new technologies, suggests that throughout a particular
innovation's life cycle, its performance improves at a decreasing rate.37 In other words,
as a technology matures, its performance growth decelerates. The first curve (A)
represents an existing technology in a mainstream market. Incremental sustaining
technologies, such as improvements in an existing product, can be thought of as points
along the curve (moving up with each new innovation). A radical sustaining technology,
such as a next-generation product, is represented by an upward shift from curve A to
curve B.38 Though the curve has shifted, it remains in the graph on the left side - this
means that the innovation is commercialized in the mainstream market application. The
37 Clayton M. Christensen, "Exploring the Limits of the Technology S-Curve," Production and Operations
Management 1, no. 4 (Fall 1992): 334-366.
38 The figures and analysis are adapted directly from The Innovator's Dilemma, 40-43.
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disruptive technology represented by curve C, consists of a shift to the emerging market
application on the right. With this shift comes a change in the performance criteria (the y
axis) for the given technology. From the perspective of mainstream customers on the left
side, the new sustaining technology performs better than the disruptive technology along
the attributes they value (the dashed C curve is drawn in on the left graph to illustrate this
point). But for customers in the emerging market on the right side, the disruptive
technology offers them superior performance along the dimensions that they value.
Technology Overshooting: How Disruptive Technologies Enter Mainstream Markets
Managers of leading firms in mainstream markets concede the initially
insignificant emerging markets to finns touting disruptive technologies, and focus on
improving their products and services for their major customers using sustaining
technologies.39 But as Christensen points out, product performance grows at a faster rate
than market demand for performance. 40 This occurs for two reasons: (1) leading firms
are under intense pressure from competitors and investors to produce better products, and
(2) some consumers with a high demand for cutting-edge technology are willing to pay
significant premiums for new products.41 The result of a strategy to consistently move
up-market for higher margins and profits, is what Henry Chesbrough calls 'technology
overshooting'.
39 Gary Pisano and Maryam Golnaraghi, "State Street Bank and Trust Company: New Product
Development," Harvard Business School Case Study 696-087, 1997.
40 The actual rates vary depending on the industry, but this has to be true in all cases. When leaders do not
stay ahead of competitors, they are soon displaced. See Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma, 31-41.
41 Geoffrey K. Gill and Steven C. Wheelwright, "Motorola, Inc.: Bandit Project (Abridged)," Harvard
Business School Case Study 692-069, 1991.
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Figure 2. Technology Overshooting
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technologies
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Time Source, C.M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma, xvi.
The trajectory map above illustrates the phenomenon of technology overshooting.
Market demand for technology is represented as the area between the two dashed lines.
The market leader produces goods and services along a technology performance
trajectory determined by sustaining innovations (curve "A"). Over time, as product
performance improves, the firm begins to climb into the higher reaches of market demand
- the northeast comer of the trajectory map, where the highest margins reside.4 2 But the
pace of innovation on the product level grows at a faster rate than the market demand
(even the high-end of the market) and, as a result, the supply of technology overshoots
the demand.43
A disruptive innovation (curve "B") is not initially performance competitive with
the mainstream technology even at the lower-end of market demand. However, as time
42 Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma, 16-18.
43 This phenomenon is observed on a daily basis by shoppers, who are bombarded by a new model personal
computer every six months or are forced to choose from 140 different types of salad dressing at the local
supermarket. See Philip B. Evans and Thomas S. Wurster, "Strategy and the New Economics of
Information," Harvard Business Review, September-October 1997, 71-82.
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passes and the product performance improves at a faster rate than market demand for
performance grows, the disruptive product begins to ascend into the mainstream
market.44 Once it penetrates the mainstream market, the disruptive product ultimately
becomes performance-competitive with the dominant product from the market's
perspective. 45 This is reflected on the graph as curve "B" travels up the performance
trajectory and intersects first low-end and then high-end market demand. Once the
disruptive product becomes performance-competitive with the dominant product, the
basis for performance changes. The market begins to consider other attributes such as
convenience, design, efficiency, and ultimately price.4 6 At this point, the disruptive
product captures a majority of the market because it is simpler, more convenient, and
cheaper.47
Value Networks: Why Leading Firms Don't Invest in Disruptive Technologies
Established firms don't invest in disruptive technologies because, Christensen
argues, disruptive technologies lie outside existing "value networks". Value networks
can be defined as, "the context within which a firm identifies and responds to customers'
needs, solves problems, procures input, reacts to competitors, and strives for profit.' 48
Firms judge the economic potential of new technologies from the perspective of their
value networks. When an innovation lies outside a particular value network, it is difficult
44 Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma, 20-24.
45 Drawn from numerous case studies. See Harvard Business School case studies, Eli Lilly and Company:
Innovation in Diabetes Care, Hewlett-Packard: The Flight of the Kittyhawk, Hydrocision, Inc., Managing
Innovation at Nypro, Inc., Hewlett-Packard's Merced Division, State Street Bank and Trust Company: New
Product Development, Motorola, Inc.: Bandit Pager Project (Abridged). For full citations see bibliography.
46 Foster, 41-53.
4 7 See note 25.
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for established companies to ascribe value to that technology. Subsequently, managers
within established firms tend to allocate resources toward sustaining innovations and
away from disruptive innovations.4 9
The theory of value networks is closely related to the organizational and
capabilities theories (mentioned at the beginning of the chapter): "As firms gain
experience within a given network, they are likely to develop capabilities, organizational
structures, and cultures tailored to their value network's distinctive requirements."5 0 But
the value network model is more robust than its predecessors because it includes the
theory of resource dependence. In her study of resource dependence, Rebecca Henderson
argues that market leaders do not invest in disruptive innovations because they are
dependent on their investors and major customers for capital.5 ' Specifically, investing in
disruptive technologies is not a rational financial decision for established competitors for
four reasons. First, disruptive products are, by definition, simpler and cheaper than
existing products, yielding lower margins. Second, disruptive technologies are first
commercialized in small emerging markets - small markets with low margins translate
into low profits. Third, the cost structures of established firns dictate the gross operating
margins and economies of scale that are necessary to make a technology viable.5 2
Finally, the leading firms' biggest customers typically do not want or cannot use
48 Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma, 32. This notion is adapted by Christensen from Giovanni Dosi's
pioneering work on "technological paradigms". See Giovanni Dosi, "Technological Paradigms and
Technological Trajectories," Research Policy (11), 1982, 147-162.
49 Ibid.
50 Richard S. Rosenbloom and Clayton M. Christensen, "Explaining the Attacker's Advantage: The
Technological Paradigms, Organizational Dynamics, and the Value Network," Research Policy (24), 1995,
233-257.
51 See Rebecca M. Henderson, "Keeping Too Close to Your Customers," Massachusetts Institute of
Technology Sloan School of Management working paper, 1993.
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disruptive products. 53 For these reasons, managers in leading companies cannot make a
case for investing in disruptive innovations until it is too late.
Innovation in Retail: A Tale of Two Stores
To better understand the theory of disruptive technologies, it is helpful to consider
a real-world example of the impact of a disruptive innovation. With this end in mind,
few industries are better suited to demonstrate the pervasive impact of disruptive
technologies than retailing, where discount retailers seized market dominance from
traditional department and variety stores.54 The innovation of discount retailing was a
disruptive technology because it challenged the existing metrics of quality retailing. The
first discount stores appeared in the greater Manhattan in the mid-1950s, operating at the
lowest end of the market by selling brand name goods at 20 to 40 percent discounts to
department store prices.55 The product selection in these stores was very limited -
inventories mostly consisted of items that every customer knew how to use, such as
brand-name hard goods (hardware, small appliances, and luggage).56 By selling simple
and well-known items, the discounters were able to keep overhead low by eliminating the
need for expensive advertising efforts and highly skilled salespeople. Significantly,
discount stores catered to the very customers that mainstream retailers found least
attractive: "young wives of blue collar workers with young children."57 These customers
valued the price and convenience of discount outlets more than the prestige and broad
52 Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma, 37-39.
53 Henderson.
54 Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma, 110-111.
55 Ibid., 111.
56 See Richard Tedlow, New and Improved: The Story of Mass Marketing in America (Boston: Harvard
Business School Press, 1996). This book contains first-rate scholarship on the history of discount retail.
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selection of products offered by the mainstream retail formats of the age. Thus, discount
retailing met the initial criteria of disruptive innovations - it was a cheaper and simpler
way to sell products, and it focused on the fringes of the mainstream market.
To be truly considered disruptive, however, a technology must offer new and
different measures of product performance. In the case of discount retailing, this was
achieved through the model of low gross margins and high inventory turnover.58 As
displayed in Table 1, discount retailers achieved returns that were comparable to
mainstream retailers, even though they captured significantly lower margins.59 Once they
were established in the fringe markets, discount retailers used their low cost structures to
climb into the higher tiers of the market and steal share from mainstream retailers. As
customer demographics changed and mainstream retailers continued to adopt innovations
aimed at their highest-margin customers (in-store fashion shows, new ways to display
products, innovative promotional schemes, expanded product lines, branded goods), they
inadvertently overshot their markets.60
Table 1. Retail Technologies: 1960
Retail Technology Leading Firm Typical Gross Average Inventory Return on
Example Margins Turnover Investment
Department Stores Sears 40% 4x 160%
Variety Stores F.W. Woolworth 36% 4x 144%
Discount Stores Kmart 20% 8x 160%
Source: C.M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma, 112.
57
"Harvard Study on Discount Shoppers," Discount Merchandiser, September, 1963, 71. This research is
provided by Christensen. See Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma, 111.
58 Ibid., 112.
59 This analysis and the chart are adapted from Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma, 112-118.
60 Tedlow, 125.
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According to Clayton Christensen, "Their [discount retailers] share of retailing
revenues in the categories of goods they sold rose from 10 percent in 1960 to nearly 40%
a scant six years later."6 ' This tremendous growth rate in goods sold, coupled with the
growth in the types of goods that discounters were selling, should have alarmed
mainstream retailers. But none of the major retail chains (Sears, Montgomery Ward, J.C.
Penney, R. H. Macy), with the exceptions of Dayton Hudson (Target), F.W. Woolworth,
and S.S. Kresge (Kmart), made an attempt to build a discount business. Comfortably and
firmly ensconced in their value networks, the highly respected management teams of
these great companies were both unwilling and unable to invest in this disruptive
technology until it was too late to build a successful discount franchise. With high
overheads and choosy clientele, the mainstream leaders were trapped in golden
handcuffs.
Of the firms that did invest in building a discount business, Kresge and Dayton
Hudson succeeded because, "they both created focused discount retailing organizations
that were independent from their traditional businesses." Realizing that the disruptive
technology did not fit into their established value networks, these firms created entirely
new value networks around discount retailing. 62 Woolworth tried to build a discount
business from within their existing variety store value network. As predicted by the
theory of disruptive technologies, the firm was unable to direct resources away from
innovations that sustained their position as a variety store towards their position as a
61 Ibid., 112.
62 In fact, Kresge dropped out of the variety store business and focused all of its resources on Kmart.
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discount retailer.63 Their commitment to their mainstream customers did not allow them
to build a value network around new customers from within the same organization. In
the mid-1960s, Sam Walton brought a disruptive merchandising technology to market
and seized the leadership position, changing the face of retailing once again. To lend
some perspective to the discussion of the impacts of disruptive innovations on the retail
industry, as of July 2000, the combined market capitalization of the three leading
discount retailers is more than 50 times larger than the combined market capitalization of
Sears, Federated Department Stores (parent of Macy's), Montgomery Ward, and J.C.
Penney, combined.64
A Framework for Innovation
The lessons learned from the retail industry, and the dozens of other industries that
felt the impacts of disruptive innovations can be distilled into four observations, which
Christensen calls "principles of disruptive innovation." 65 These principles together form
a framework for thinking about how innovations affect firms and industries. They are
briefly summarized below as tools for thinking about innovation in the real estate
industry, and are the subject of the next three chapters:
1. Companies depend on customers for resources. Firms that succeed, do so because
they successfully build effective value networks around core products and
services. Within these networks, major customers effectively control the
63 For a sharp rendition of the Woolworth debacle, see Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma, 111-114.
64 The top three discount retailing firms measured by market capitalization, are Walmart Stores, Dayton
Hudson, and Kmart. Industry data provided online by www.schwab.com on 7/26/00.
6 5 Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma, 97.
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allocation of resources through their ability to influence revenues. Resources are
directed towards sustaining technologies because major customers don't need
disruptive technologies. This implies that managers of established firms seeking
to invest in disruptive innovations are best advised to embed these projects within
independent organizations that have customers who need such innovations and
managers that are focused on and rewarded for addressing these customers.
Innovations must be aligned with customers.6 6
2. Small markets don't solve the growth needs of large companies. Leading firms
initially reject disruptive technologies because they are commercialized in
emerging markets. Because emerging markets are young, they don't offer large
firms sufficient near-term growth opportunities. By the time these markets
become large enough to be interesting, it is often too late to build a new business.
Thus, to develop a disruptive technology, an industry leader should invest in an
independent organization that is, "small enough to get excited about small
opportunities and small wins." 6 7 The size of the firm must match the size of the
market.
3. Markets that don't exist cannot be analyzed. Sound market research leads to
successful strategies to commercialize sustaining technologies, but failed
approaches to disruptive technologies. This is because the ultimate market
application for a disruptive technology cannot be known in advance - the
29
66 Ibid., 98.67 Ibid., 99.
evolution of a successful product is almost always the result of an iterative trial-
and-error process. This implies that established firms should, "plan to fail early
and inexpensively in the search for the market for a disruptive technology." 6 8
4. Technology supply may not equal market demand. Disruptive technologies are
often unattractive to mainstream markets for the very same reasons that they are
attractive to emerging markets. This suggests that managers who invest in
disruptive technologies must find or develop new markets that value the attributes
of disruptive technologies, rather than look for ways to commercialize these
innovations in established markets. 9
Having reviewed some major cutting-edge theories on managing innovation that were
developed through the study of other industries, Chapter 2 presents an analysis of the real
estate industry from the perspective of the innovation framework.
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68 Ibid., 100.
69 Ibid.
Chapter 2. Real Estate Disrupted
While few observers consider the real estate industry to be a forward thinking,
fast-moving, and technologically dynamic industry, the industry does have a number of
points in common with the fast-pace high-tech industries discussed previously.
Throughout the industry's history, successful owners/developers, service providers
(brokers, financiers, property managers, etc.), and constructors have evolved through the
adoption of a series of sustaining innovations. These innovations range from incremental
improvements in tools used in the industry to fairly radical changes in construction
techniques.7 0 The key is that these sustaining technological innovations were created to
modify or enhance the existing way that these groups do business.
More recently, this industry once characterized by back of the envelope deals,
inordinately long negotiation periods, and territorial brokers, has been flooded by very
specific, potentially disruptive technologies that are changing the manner in which the
industry operates. According to a recent study by Credit Suisse First Boston, there are
over 214 internet technologies that are currently being adapted to service the real estate
industry. The study further states that these, along with other technological innovations
will change the very nature of the real estate industry. The study indicates that roughly
70 Scholars often measure technological progress in terms of incremental and radical advances. Incremental
advances are those innovations that improve upon existing components and refine current system design.
Radical advances, on the other hand, are new technologies that will enhance the existing process. See
Clayton M. Christensen, "Exploring the Limits of the Technology S-Curve," Production and Operations
Management (1), 1992, 334-336.
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80% of the real estate Internet ventures are targeting new or emerging markets and are
departing from traditional real estate practices.71
How much of an effect will these new, potentially disruptive technologies have on
the real estate industry? We look at three groups within the industry, namely, service
providers, constructors, and owners/developers, to assess how technology has changed
the way business is conducted within the industry. We further assess the nature of the
technologies that have incited the change (sustaining vs. disruptive) and will discuss the
origins of these technologies.
The Service Industry
The real estate brokerage, mortgage brokerage, and property management
industries historically have been relationship-based industries. The service industry's
value network has designated people (brokers and managers) as the facilitators of
relationships, listings, transactions, etc. Therefore, a number of the established service
providers have been reluctant to venture outside of their value networks to explore
potentially disruptive technologies that may add value to their existing business
paradigms. The service group has also adopted the terms of "secretive and territorial" as a
part of their value networks.72 This facet of the value network has further impeded the
exploration of disruptive technologies that may threaten the groups existing revenue
models, namely commissions. Despite the established firms' best efforts to thwart the
71 Interview with Jason Alexander, Real Estate Group, Credit Suisse First Boston, 6/7/2000.
72 Information taken from telephone interviews with 4 brokers, Grubb and Ellis, 4/22/2000.
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introduction of potentially disruptive technologies, a number of start-ups have embraced
the new technologies and are forcing changes among all players in the service group.
Real estate brokers have earned the moniker as the most "cantankerous"
individuals to work with within the real estate industries. Likewise, their area of the
service sector has been the recipient of a firestorm of technological innovations. These
innovations have been viewed as "threatening" by a large portion of the brokerage
industry as they may replace some of the services typically provided by brokers. 73
Initially, the industry was satisfied with incremental, sustaining technological innovations
that would enhance their existing business models and give them an air of technological
advancement. For example, Colliers International built a website that acted as an intranet
for their brokers. This allows brokers to network, via the web, with their co-workers.
Further, Colliers created an online, information based service for their clients, which
allows them to view bios and listings of the participating brokers. These initial
innovations were attractive, but didn't drastically change the way in which the brokerage
industry functions.74
In 1995 Dennis DeAndre, founder of Loopnet.com, set out to unify what is a very
fragmented industry. His goal was to create an online Multiple Listing Service that
would enable brokers and the general public to have access to listings nationwide. The
industry leaders (Insignia, Colliers International, Cushman & Wakefield, Grubb & Ellis,
73Interview with John McLernan, CEO, Colliers, Macaulay, Nichols, Inc., 4/3/2000.
74 For further information concerning Colliers and their current online initiatives, see www.colliers.com.
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and Jones Lang LaSalle) bought into the vision and partnered with Loopnet.75 The hope
was to transform the industry; however, the result was an incremental modification in the
way brokers accessed listings. Initially, the idea was a success and a number of large-
scale brokerages bought into the model. Brokers were excited and motivated and put
their best listings with Loopnet. However, due to unknown reasons, traffic to Loopnet
dropped off considerably. Brokers pulled their premier "pocket" listings from the site
leaving their "dogs" there.76
This was, however, an important step. The Loopnet innovation caught the
attention of the major players in the brokerage industry. They witnessed the excitement
that Loopnet initially generated and realized the potential that a sound, online business
model carried. Driven by hopes to strengthen their competitive advantage, the major
brokerages put their own technological initiatives at the top of their priority lists. They
weren't prepared, however, to venture past their traditional models and risk disappointing
their traditional client base by stepping into the realm of disruptive technologies. There
were smaller groups that were willing to take the plunge and they would ultimately shape
the markets growth curve in the years to come. Groups such as Zethus came into the
brokerage market with much more aggressive initiatives.7 7 They weren't looking to
improve upon existing value networks, but to change the way business was conducted
altogether. Zethus looked to get away from the simple posting of listings online and the
matching of brokers with clients. They set out to create a forum where properties could
75 For further information, see the "History of Loopnet" at www.loopnet.com.
7 6 Interview with John McLernan, CEO, Colliers, Macaulay, Nichols, Inc., 4/3/2000.
77 Zethus.com is a Cushman & Wakefield project. For more information see
www.cushmanwakefield.com/.
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be bought and sold online. The entire process would take place online in virtual
exchange. The idea of cutting the traditional broker and buying/selling process out
completely was so radical, and maybe threatening, that Julien J. Studley, CEO of Studley
Inc., commented on the new brokerage model saying, "there are too may twists and turns
in large commercial contracts/leases to trade commercial space like winter wheat".78
Indeed, Zethus' early days of inception were rough. In addition to fending off angry
brokers, they were having a difficult time convincing buyers that an online real estate
exchange was an acceptable forum to transact these deals. A new market of radical,
forward-thinking property owners and tenants emerged paving the way for the success of
Zethus. This opened the floodgates as Goldman Sachs eagerly financed the enhancement
of the venture with $40 million. 79 Soon Zethus was being courted by some of the major,
established brokerage groups who finally realized that to safeguard their current market
share and eventually move into the emerging market fueled by the new economy they
would have to adopt some of these disruptive technologies into their value networks.
Cushman & Wakefield was the successful courtier and will co-brand with Zethus in this
new venture. 80 This disruptive technology has grabbed the attention of the brokerage
community and may change the manner in which the brokerage industry functions. The
end result may be a shift in the S-Curves, which, in essence, would create a new
brokerage market. The following figure illustrates the shift that would occur in the
brokerage market's S-Curves if the Zethus technology proves to be disruptive (See Figure
3).
78 "Commercial Property: Trading Real Estate Like Winter Wheat". The New York Times, 7/25/2000.
79 See www.cushmanwakefield.com for information concerning Zethus and their financial partners.
80 For further information regarding Zethus and online real estate exchanges visit
www.cushmanwakefield.com.
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Figure 3. Disruptive Technology S-Curves in the Real
Estate Brokerage Industry
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The mortgage brokerage industry has also undergone serious changes as a result
of technological advances. In the beginning, mortgage brokers used the internet as a
dating service of sorts. They would shop their mortgages and bios, and hope for a
consumer to contact them to transact the mortgage. This process evolved into a true
online matching service with groups like EquityCity.com matching consumers looking
for financing and brokers offering acceptable financing.8' The two parties would then
interact offline to complete the transaction. These technological advances while helpful,
only modified the way in which the financing process took place.
A disruptive technology was just around the corner. In June of 2000,
CapitalEngine.com completed the first widely known financing of a real estate project
81 For further information on online finance matching services see www.equitycity.com.
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online from start to finish. 82 The group used a new "digital handshake" 83 technology
patented by iLumin that facilitates the legal, contractual transaction online in a secure
setting. This new technology facilitating the start to finish transaction of real estate
financing online will invariably change the way property is financed.
The property management sector within the services group has been slow to react
to the rush of technological advances in the real estate industry. However, a number of
aggressive new groups have thrown their hats into the management/maintenance industry
with the objective of changing the way properties are managed. In the past the extent of
the technology utilized by property management groups was an online customer support
function allowing tenants to submit complaints/requests online. The general feeling was
that the property management industry was technologically deficient and would require
significant advancements to service tenants and properties in the new economy.84 Groups
such as EggSystems.com would change the very way managers watched over properties
and interacted with their tenants. The majority of tenant/manager interaction and
virtually all necessary transactions would be completed online. Lease payments, the
monitoring of building systems, online work orders, property surveillance, and online
communities are just a few of the services that would be conducted online. The
combination of the technologies is disruptive and changes the manner in which properties
are managed, allowing an east coast management group to manage a west coast property
82 For further information regarding online transaction of mortgages see www.capitalengine.com.
83 For further information regarding the "digital handshake" see www.ilumin.com.
84 Interview with Terrence Diafario, VP eCommerce, eggsystems.com, 7/3/2000.
37
and maintain the efficiency and effectiveness demanded by the tenants and property
owners.85
The Construction Industry
Not unlike the real estate service industry, the construction group has also been
the recipient of a number of creative innovations that are catching the industry's
attention. The work of the construction group (includes architects, engineers, and
constructors) has always been considered technical in nature. However, until recently
their business has been typified by very non-technical innovations such as drafting tables,
scales, tool belts, and hand-written work orders. This has changed dramatically since
1999 as more than 250 internet start-ups with more than $300 million dollars of financing
have turned their focus to the construction industry.86
Traditional architects and engineers had their worlds turned upside down when a
couple of small software companies introduced CAD software that would enable the
architect or engineer to complete their drawings in a fraction of the time it took to draft
and would allow for flexibility in the modification of the drawings. Drafting tables are
swiftly becoming a novelty in architectural and engineering firms. They have, for the
most part, been replaced by computer tables.87
85 For further information on complete online property management solutions see www.eggsystems.com.
86 See www.cephren.com for a complete listing of press releases concerning innovation in the construction
industry.
87 Information concerning the CAD industry was taken from a face-to-face interview conducted by Tyler
Thompson with Martin Knopken, General Counsel, Autodesk Inc. 6/22/1999.
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A recent web based architectural innovation promises to challenge the current
architectural process. ePlans.com offers a unique service to the general public. The web-
based system allows the public to browse thousands of previously drafted residential
plans and further lets them modify the interiors and exteriors of the plans once they've
chosen a set. The plans can then be purchased online for a fraction of the cost that a
traditional architect would charge for the delivery of a custom plan. 88 This technology
could be potentially disruptive in that it allows the public to create a custom set of
architectural plans for a fraction of the price of those produced by traditional architects.
The innovation is new, however, eplans.com boasts over 1 million plans being sold from
1999-2000.
The construction industry has also been shocked by the recent wave of technical
innovations that have set out to streamline and expedite an integral part of the
construction process, namely project management and the securing and delivery of
construction supplies/materials. Cephren.com, founded in 1999, has come to the
forefront as the premier online project management solution and portal for securing all
necessary building materials. Despite a rocky start in the U.S. in 1999, Cephren found
success in emerging markets such as Taiwan, Brazil, and the UK. They have since
captured the attention of the U.S. market and have coordinated services for construction
in 2000 totaling $40 billion. The technology has provided a more efficient project
88 ePlans.com is a Hanley-Wood, LLC venture. For more information concerning online architecture, see
www.eplans.com. The eplans.com price for a set of custom plans (3 working plans) is $695.
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management solution and allows constructors to bypass the traditional, arduous process
of securing building materials.89
The construction industry has recently become the benefactor of the marriage of
two disruptive technologies within the industry. This marriage may prove to be a turnkey
solution for the construction planning and material procurement processes. The innovator
is CADalist.com. They have created a web-based system that will combine CAD
technologies that will seamlessly flow into estimates, project timelines, project
management, and delivery of materials. The entire process is managed from one site.
The technology should prove to be more cost effective, accurate, and efficient. The early
critics are predicting the creation of a new market and a new standard for the industry.90
Owners/Developers
Each of the technologies discussed in the service and construction groups has
changed the way in which owners/developers operate. Online forums such as
Pikenet.com and BOMA.org have long allowed developers to stay in touch with market
trends, their employees, and development organizations.9l However, as a result of the
disruptive technologies being introduced into the industry, a new breed of developer has
emerged, the "armchair developer". In a study conducted by an NYU graduate student,
an entire hypothetical development in Los Angeles was virtually orchestrated from a one-
89 Cephren.com formerly operated as eBricks.com. For more information see www. cephren.com.
90 Further information concerning CADalist.com is currently unavailable as they are in the beta testing
stages of their technology.
91 For more information about existing online developer/owner resources visit www.pikenet.com or
www.boma.org (the Building Owners and Managers Association).
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bedroom apartment in Manhattan. 92 Every aspect of the development process from the
purchase of the property, planning, financing, building, leasing, and managing was
coordinated and conducted online. The only part of the process that couldn't be
transacted online was the entitlement process (permitting, etc.). However, both
Cephren.com and CADalist.com are currently beta testing technologies that would enable
developers and constructors to submit applications for permits online and would further
enable government agencies to grant or reject the permits online.93
The barrage of disruptive technologies has given owners/developers to develop
worldwide in a cost effective, secure, and efficient manner. The innovations have also
opened the door to newcomers, allowing them to enter the ferocious world of
development and to try their hand.
In each of the three sub-groups of the real estate industry, the core value networks
have changed with the introduction of disruptive technologies. The following is a figure
representing the changes in the development, service, and construction value networks
(Figure 4).94
92 A brief synopsis of the study was found in "Armchair Real Estate". Metro Market Facts. (1999). The
authors were unable to obtain a copy of or citation for the actual study.
93 See www.cephren.com for further information on their current online initiatives.
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94 The real estate innovation diagram is adapted from a framework established by Clayton Christensen and
Richard Rosenbloom in "Explaining the Attacker's Advantage: Technological Paradigms, Organizational
Dynamics, and the Value Network."
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The Origin of Disruptive Innovation
With the attention generated by disruptive technologies, and the opportunities for
new market share that subsequently arise, the question often asked is , "If the end of
result of these disruptive technologies is potential increased market share and profits,
why don't established fins spend more of their time and efforts to create and exploit
these technologies?" Disruptive technologies almost always exist outside of the
organizations existing value network. Often any action outside of an organization's
existing value network is worrisome to clients, partners, and investors. Therefore,
organizations often shy away from any innovations outside of their value networks. 95
This explains why disruptive technologies such as those presented by Zethus,
Eggsystems, Cephren, and CADalist all originated in small start-up or break-off groups.
Of all the disruptive innovations listed in the previous figure, all but one originated in
start-up or break-off groups. Larger, established companies are now supporting, using, or
partnering with each of the disruptive innovations. In order to better understand the origin
of these technologies, an example of a typical decision process is outlined below.
Step 1: Disruptive Technologies Are First
Developed/Conceived Within Established Firms-It is often the
case that disruptive technologies are conceived within established
firms. However, sustaining projects that meet the needs of the
firms existing clients, partners, investors, and workforce almost
always preempt disruptive projects that may service smaller and
95 For more information regarding Managerial Decision-Making and Disruptive Technological Change, see
Clayton Christensen's "The Innovator's Dilemma".
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poorly defined markets. For example, Cushman & Wakefield first
conceived the notion of an online real estate exchange. The
project, however, was shelved as it threatened the group's existing
value network.9 6
Step 2: Established Firms Step Up the Pace of Sustaining
Technological Development-After the disruptive technologies
are shelved as a result of the negative response they receive from
those associated with the firm's value network, the firm will often
refocus their efforts on the innovation of new sustaining
technologies. Cushman & Wakefield followed suit after shelving
the idea of a real estate exchange. They turned their attention to
technologies that would reinforce their existing value network and
in turn satisfy those associated with the network. They announced
their partnership with Loopnet.com and proceeded to build out
CushmanWakefield.com, an online information based brokerage
community.
Step 3: Start-Up and Break-Off Groups are Formed, and
Markets for the Disruptive Technologies are Found-New
groups form with the sole goal of exploiting disruptive
technologies and the markets they represent. These new, smaller
groups are often in a better position to explore disruptive
96 Interview with John McLernan, CEO, Colliers, Macaulay, Nichols, Inc., 4/3/2000.
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technologies as their value networks are new and flexible. They
are not beholden to the same extensive client, partner, investor, and
employee bases. The group that would soon be known as Zethus
started bouncing their idea of an online real estate exchange off
forward-thinking individuals in the market.
Step 4: The New Entrants Move Upmarket-Once these new
groups discover that they have sparked an interest in an emerging
market, they often set their sights on the established markets within
their industries. With the addition of sustaining technologies to
enhance their disruptive technologies, the new entrants establish
themselves and their value networks as viable alternatives. Zethus,
with the aid of sustaining technologies such as online certification
and verification, established itself as a viable alternative to the
traditional method of buying and selling real estate.9 7
Step 5: Established Firms Belatedly Jump on the Bandwagon
to Defend Their Market Share-Often in a panic, as these new
entrants successful penetrate the established markets, established
finns scramble to either duplicate the disruptive technology or
partner with the new entrant. In Cushman & Wakefield's case,
97 For more information about Zethus' strategic sustaining partnerships, see www.cushmanwakefield.com.
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they went from initially rejecting the concept and technology to
fully embracing it with a new partnership with Zethus. 98
The goal in presenting the above information is to paint an illustrative picture of
what is currently driving the real estate industry. It is apparent that although important to
the industry's longevity, sustaining technologies aren't the driving force. The face of the
industry is changing as a result of disruptive technologies. These disruptive technologies
result in a shift in the industry's S-Curves, which in turn creates a new market or expands
an existing market and invariably changes the way business is conducted. It is also
apparent that the groups that are most successful and able to introduce these disruptive
technologies are small, start-up or break-off groups that have flexible value networks and
are able to experiment in emerging markets.
The following chapter will, using the frameworks and theories discussed in the
previous chapters, explore the specific impacts that both sustaining and disruptive
innovation have had on the retail sector of the real estate industry.
98 The Cushman & Wakefield/Zethus narrative in the Managerial Decision-Making and Disruptive
Technological Change description came from 3 telephone interviews conducted with 3 C&W brokers,
3/2000-4/2000.
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Chapter 3. Innovation in Retail Development
In few areas of the real estate industry has the impact of innovation been felt so
pervasively as in retail development, where the shopping center seized dominance from
traditional retail formats and stitched itself into the social fabric of modem American
society. In the course of the twentieth century, retail development has evolved from a
cottage industry of merchant-owned downtown stores into a dynamic system of
interwoven products and services.99 This chapter seeks to analyze innovation in the retail
development business using the theoretical tools that were articulated in Chapter 1 and
applied to three real estate industry subgroups (services, construction, and development)
in Chapter 2. The analysis begins with a big-picture overview of the impact of disruptive
technologies in retail development, and proceeds with a detailed discussion of how and
why specific innovations changed the competitive landscape of the industry.
The history of retail development is rich with examples of technological
innovations that have improved the shopping experience for consumers and provided
retailers with new and exciting ways to merchandise their goods and services. The
development of retail real estate has grown in scale and scope from less than 10 million
square feet of shop space in 1900 to more than 5 billion square feet spread over 40
different retail formats in 2000.00° Figure 5 summarizes the evolution of retail
development in the twentieth century.
99 See Alexander Buil and Nicholas Ordway, "Shopping Center Innovations: The Past 50 Years," Urban
Land (June 1987), 22-23.
100 See "The Scope of the Shopping Center Industry in the United States," International Council of
Shopping Centers Report (Spring 2000), available at www.icsc.org, under "/research".
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Figure 5. The Evolution of Retail Development, 1900-20001°
* *0
101 Chart is adapted from Bul and Ordway, 24. Additional data was drawn from Robert E. O'Neill and
Sandra M. Sutton, "A History of the Shopping Center Industry," Monitor, August 1990. Data on the online
retail development formats collected by the authors from www.amazon.com, and www.gatewav.com.
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A. Early Retail Development Formats
Downtown Shopping Districts
snoppmg Streets
Groupings of Neighborhood Stores
Freestanding Grocery and Department Stores
B. Prototypical Shopping Center Formats
Architecturally Unified Blocks of Stores
Koland Fark (1V0/) Baltimore, MD
Unified Shopping Districts
Country Club Plaza (1922) Kansas City, MO
C. Early Shopping Center Formats
Community Shopping Centers
Highland Park (1931) Dallas, IX
Regional Malls
Northgate (1950) Seattle, WA
Enclosed Malls
Southdale Center (1956) Edina, MN
D. Innovations in Shopping Center Development
Centers in Mixed-Use Developments
Houston Galleria (1969) Houston, TX
Multilevel Downtown Centers
Water Tower Place (1976) Chicago, IL
Festival Markets
Faneuil Hall (1976) Boston, MA
Specialty or Theme Centers
Pier 39 (1978) San Francisco, CA
Super Regional Malls
West Edmonton Mall (1981) Edmonton, Alberta
Outlet/Off-Price Malls
Potomac Mills (1985) Woodbridge, VA
Power Centers
280 Metro Center (1986) Colma, CA
E. Other Retail Development Formats
Entertainment Anchored Shopping Centers
Mini-malls
Anchorless Shopping Centers
Airport/Travel Oriented Malls
Infill Shopping Centers
Shopping Center Condominiums
Underground Shopping Centers
F. Online Retail Development Formats
Virtual Stores
Gateway Country (1996) Orange, CT
Distribution Facilities
Amazon.com Facility (1996) Seattle, WA
Customer Service/Fulfillment Centers
Amazon.com Center (1996) Seattle, WA
I....................................................................................................................................................
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Retail Development "Technologies"
The innovations listed in Figure 5 along with the projects that featured them are
widely regarded by retail developers as landmark advances in retail development
technology. Technology, as it relates to retail development, can be thought of as the
process of bringing together land, labor, and materials to produce a structure or set of
structures that house stores.102 In broader terms, a retail development technology is a
physical format that links retailers to consumers. Using this notion of technology, each
of the innovations listed in Figure 5 represent distinct retail development technologies.
Some of these technologies are incremental, such as the evolution of the downtown
shopping district, and some of them are radical, such as the development of the enclosed
mall. The first challenge in organizing these technologies for the purpose of our analysis
is to identify a dominant technological paradigm to which the disruptive technology
framework can then be applied.103 A technological paradigm can be thought of as a
'master' or 'meta' technology that controls a group of subsequent technologies through a
shared set of characteristics.104 With regard to retail development, the first technological
paradigm of the twentieth century can be called independent development technology. 105
Independent Development Technology
Getting its start in the growing downtown markets of the early 1900s, this
technology consists of acquiring a piece of land and building a customized structure for a
single retailer. The structure is physically 'independent' from surrounding structures and
102 This applied notion of 'technology' is based on the general notion explained in Chapter 1. See
Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma, xii.
103 The idea of organizing technologies into paradigms was first presented by Giovanni Dosi. See Dosi, 34.
04 Dosi, 40.
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is planned and designed to provide a unique point-of-sale for a retailer within a local
market.'06 Independent development technology dominated retail development from the
latter part of the nineteenth century through the first quarter of the twentieth century.'0 7
Because this technology emerged within an urban context in an age when consumers
lacked cars and were therefore relatively immobile, independent retail formats were
pedestrian oriented and centrally located. 108 (This technology is represented in Figure 5,
Box A.) Thus, the dominant retail development paradigm in this period measured
performance in terms of direct and convenient access to urban consumers.
Disruptive Retail Technologies
With regard to primarily rural retail development before 1900, the first
technological paradigm of the twentieth century can be called a "disruptive" development
technology. The reader will recall that a disruptive technology is defined as an
innovation that introduces a new value paradigm to the market and changes the basis of
competition between firms in an industry.l09 Disruptive products are typically simpler
and cheaper and initially appeal to emerging markets, coming to dominate mainstream
markets when they become performance competitive with established products. l °1 Thus,
disruptive technology theory differentiates innovations primarily based on the way they
affect the dimensions of performance demanded by the market. Using this theory to
differentiate among the wide array of retail development technologies in Figure 5, three
105 See Bil and Ordway, 22. They use the term "independent retailing."
106 See, "Shopping Center Development Handbook," Urban Land Institute, second edition, 1995.
107 O'Neill and Sutton, 11.
108 See Tedlow, Chapter 2.
109 See Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma, 22.
10 Foster, 47.
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disruptive technological paradigms can be identified: unified development, value
development, and cyber development." ' These technologies were disruptive because
they fundamentally changed the relationship between retailers and consumers,
permanently altered the dimensions by which the performance of retail development was
judged, and redefined the competitive landscape in the retail development industry.
Unified Development Technology
Starting in the 1920s, disruptive unified development technology emerged to
serve the growing suburban markets that independent developers largely ignored.112 Less
elaborate than their independent counterparts, early unified developments were simple
groupings of stores that were designed, constructed, owned, and managed by third-party
firms. 113 These firms developed 'shopping centers' which brought together wide groups
of different retailers as rent-paying tenants into a set of uniformly designed and
constructed buildings within a particular suburban trade area (represented in Figure 4 by
each of the formats listed in box B, C, D, and E, except for "Outlet/Off-Price Malls" and
"Power Centers")." 4 These technologies catered to vehicle-equipped growing suburban
populations who primarily valued access to a wide array of retailers, locations proximate
to homes, sufficient parking, and entertainment." 5 Over the next 60 years, as suburban
populations exploded and urban populations remained stagnant, unified technology
11l The distinction between independent development and unified development is articulated by the Urban
Land Institute. See Biil and Ordway, 23. The "value" and "cyber" distinctions are drawn by the authors.
Biul and Ordway, 25-27.
113 See Don Wharton, "Those Amazing Shopping Centers," Readers Digest Volume 80, Number 481, May
1962, 180.
114 O'Neill and Sutton, 11-13.
115 See Wharton, 182.
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became the dominant paradigm within retail development. 1 16 Beginning with the
shopping center format, unified technology evolved into regional malls, which were
designed and built throughout the 60s, 70s, and 80s, to provide suburban communities
with places to gather and interact with one another. As it has matured, unified
development technology has come to define performance along increasingly social
dimensions, incorporating a growing number of entertainment retailers and restaurants
into the shopping center concept.1 17
Value Development Technology
The early 1980s saw the advent of the disruptive value development technology.
This technology introduced a new value proposition that was largely missing from
established retail development by developing suburban retail formats that emphasized
efficiency and price. 118 Originally established to provide deep discount warehouse-type
retailers with access to low-income consumers, these formats sacrifice proximity to
consumers, convenience, and selection to emphasize access to value retailers and their
products.l19 Value technologies are cheaper and simpler in design and construction than
both independent and unified development technologies, consisting of a set of large
warehouses constructed outdoors with minimal attention paid to pedestrian traffic.' 20
These formats offer depth and breadth of merchandise at discount prices for selected
types of hard and soft goods, such as electronics, furniture, books, hardware, toys, food,
16 See Paul Doocey, "Postcards From The Past," Shopping Centers Today, May 1992, 153.117 Bul and Ordway, 28.
118 See "Mall Customer Shopping Patterns," ICSC Research Quarterly Volume 5, Number 3, Fall 1998, 3.
119 See Michael D. Beyard, "Power Centers: A Development and Investment Perspective," ULI position
paper, Fall 1996, 1-3. Available at www.uli.org.
'20 O'Neill and Sutton, 17.
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housewares, and factory seconds of fashion apparel.121 (This technology is reflected in
Figure 4 as "Outlet/Off-Price Centers" and "Power Centers" in box D.)
Cyber Development Technoloey
Cyber development technology began in the mid 1990s in response to the growth
of online retailers. This relatively young disruptive technology enables online retailers to
provide goods and services to consumers through the Internet.' 22 Cyber development
represents a dramatic departure from conventional retail formats in that the role of
physical space as a link between consumers and retailers is completely redefined.
Harkening back to nineteenth century mail-order systems, the 'cyber store' is a network
of computers linked to customer service centers and warehouses that caters exclusively to
online consumers. 123 As of August 2000, cyber retail technology has produced three
types of development formats: virtual stores, distribution facilities, and customer service
facilities (reflected in Figure 4 as box E, "Online Retail Development Formats"). These
formats offer unprecedented levels of shopping convenience to consumers while
maximizing market coverage and market penetration for retailers.l2 4 Performance of
cyber development is measured by efficient distribution of products and access to
transportation. The technologies in Figure 5 are reproduced in Figure 6 below in terms of
the dominant retail development technology paradigms described above.
121 Beyard.
122 See "e-Commerce," ICSC White Paper, Spring 2000, 2.
123 See, "Hotwired," The Industry Standard, June 1999, 23-28.
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Figure 6. Dominant Technological Paradigms in Retail Development (1900-2000)
- 19U0
- 1920
-1940
- 1960
- 1980 Value Development Technology
Suburban, Efficiency, Prices
* Outlet/Off-Price Malls
* Power Centers
- IAAA
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Independent Retail Development Technology
Urban, Pedestrian Oriented, Central Location
* Downtown Shopping Districts
* Shopping Streets
* Groupings of Neighborhood Stores
* Freestanding Grocery and Department
Stores
Unified Retail Development Technology
Suburban, Vehicle Oriented, Selection of Stores, Entertainment
* Architecturally Unified Blocks of Stores
* Unified Shopping Districts
* Community Shopping Centers
* Regional Malls
* Enclosed Malls
* Centers in Mixed-Use Developments
* Multilevel Downtown Centers
* Festival Markets
* Specialty or Theme Centers
* Super Regional Malls
* Entertainment Anchored Shopping Centers
* Mini-malls
* Anchorless Shopping Centers
* Airport/Travel Oriented Malls
* Infill Shopping Centers
* Shopping Center Condominiums
* Underground Shopping Centers
Cyber Development Technology
Convenience, Access to Shipping, Market Coverage
* Virtual Stores
E ~ , 4 * .
* Customer Service/Fulfillment Centers
124 See "Successful Online Retail Strategies," online article 6/14/00 by Gomez Advisors, a leading Internet
consulting group located at www.gomez.com.
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Figure 6 summarizes the evolution of retail development using the theory of
disruptive technologies. Each dominant paradigm is listed with its dominant
characteristics (in italics) and its component technologies along the time line on the left
hand side of the figure. The next section considers the performance of each of the four
technologies listed above in order to better understand how retail development evolved in
the twentieth century.
Performance of Retail Technology
Ultimately, the performance of a retail technology is measured by its growth
trajectory. This growth is a function of the success and profitability of the technology
relative to competing technologies in the marketplace.125 Figure 7 charts the growth
trajectories of each of the four dominant technological paradigms in retail development in
the twentieth century. The solid lines represent the growth in supply of the four dominant
retail development technologies, while the dashed lines represent the growth in demand
in the primary markets where these technologies were initiated. The slopes of each of the
trajectories represent estimated growth rates of supply and demand during the time period
for which each of the four technologies held a significant market position (1900-1940 for
independent technology, 1940-2000 for unified technology, 1986-2000 for value
technology, and 1996-2000+ for cyber technology). They extend out to represent how
55
125 Christensen, 48.
much capacity within each technology would be supplied if that technology continued on
its established growth pattern.126
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Measuring growth in supply of each technology is a relatively straightforward
process that consists of measuring the change in the amount of retail development
product (in square feet) over a period of time (years) and deriving an annually
126 For example, the 'Independent Retail Technology' curves represent the growth trajectories that were
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compounded average growth rate. 127 The slope of each solid line represents the average
annual growth rate in the amount of new product built within each technological
paradigm from 1900 to 2000. Measuring demand for a specific retail technology is not as
straightforward. Some theorists argue that demand is based on average rents, reasoning
that better development formats command higher rents from retail tenants. 2 8 Other
scholars have argued that growth in sales per square foot is the best measure of demand
for retail formats.' 29 Still others have suggested that demand for a retail format can be
measured by comparing actual sales growth to "sales potential growth," which is a
theoretical measure of sales productivity based on population growth and spending
patterns. 130 While each of these approaches sheds considerable light on the underlying
factors affecting demand for retail space, they are primarily short-run (12 to 36 months)
demand models that are used to predict future patterns in demand for retail space. The
absence of systematic long-run (5 to 50 years) data on per square foot sales, rents, and
vacancy rates severely limits the effectiveness of these approaches in explaining
historical changes in retail development demand.' 3 ' Borrowing from the classical theory
of retail competition, in which stores are held to compete with each other along the
dimensions of price and location, the best and most consistent long-run measure of
established during 1900-1940. For further elaboration, see Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma, Ch. 2.
127 A compounded annual average growth rate [r] is calculated in the following way: X1 x (+r)T = X2,
where X1 is the level of square footage at the beginning of the period, X2 is the level of square footage at
the end of the period, T is the number of years in the period.
12 8 See John M. Clapp and Stephen D. Messner, Real Estate Market Analysis: Methods and Applications
(New York: Praeger, 1988) chapter 3.
129 See, Gaylon M. Greer and Michael D. Farrell, Investment Analysis for Real Estate Decisions (Chicago:
Dearborn Financial Services Publishing, 1993).
130 See Douglas M. Casey, "Overstoring: A Look at Retail Space and Sales Performance, " ICSC Research
Quarterly Volume 3, (Number 3, Fall 1996) 13.
131 See Denise DiPasquale and William C. Wheaton, Urban Economics and Real Estate Markets
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1996) 270.
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demand for retail space is population growth. 132 The use of population growth as a proxy
for retail development is not a new approach. It has long been common wisdom in the
development business that "retail follows rooftops."1 33 Simply stated, the growth in
demand for a particular retail technology is strongly correlated to the growth of its core
consumer constituency. 134 Thus, the dashed line represents the compounded annual
growth rates in the primary consumer constituencies for each development technology:
city populations from 1900 through 1940 for independent technology, suburban
populations from 1940 through 2000 for unified technology, lower-income populations
from 1980 through 2000, and Internet usage among the population for cyber development
technology.135 The difference in slopes between the supply line (solid) and the demand
line (dashed) represents market oversupply for each technology. 136 Figure 7 graphically
portrays the effect of disruptive innovation on the retail development sub-sector and the
shift from independent to unified technologies as well as the growing threat of value and
cyber development technologies.
Independent development technology grew from roughly 20 million square feet of
product in 1900 to roughly 300 million square feet of product in 1940, translating into an
132 See William B. Breuggeman and Jeffrey D. Fisher, Real Estate Finance and Investments Tenth Edition,
(Boston: Irwin McGraw-Hill, 1997) 272-274.
133 The origin of this quote is from visionary early twentieth century developer J.C. Nichols. See O'Neill
and Sutton, 56.
134 This is also true for the demand for hard disk drives. See Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma, 28.
135 The historical data on population growth is drawn from the U.S. Department of the Census
(www.census.gov) and the United States Historical Census Data Browser, an online data source available
from the University of Virginia at www.fisher.lib.virginia.edu/census. Data on Internet usage drawn from
Forrester Research, at www.forrester.com. Growth rates are calculated in the same manner as for supply of
space. See note 119.
See A.H. Studenmund, Using Econometrics: A Practical Guide Third Edition (Menlo Park, CA:
Addison-Wesley, 1997) 466-493.
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average compounded growth rate of roughly 7% per annum. 13 7 Population growth in
urban centers averaged roughly 4% per annum between 1900 and 1940.138 Unified
development technology has grown from less than 10 million square feet of product in
1940 to more than 5 billion square feet of product in 2000, a compounded average annual
growth rate of about 11%.139 During this same period, suburban population growth
averaged approximately 8%.140 Value development technology began in the early
eighties with a handful of power and outlet centers throughout the country and has grown
from less than 5 million square feet in 1986 to more than 500 million square feet in 2000,
an impressive annual growth rate of approximately 39%. 141 The growth of lower-income
populations during this period averaged 16% per year.14 2 Cyber retail development
technology began in 1996 with less than 1 million square feet of space and has grown to
just over 20 million square feet in 2000, with projections for up to 70 million square feet
by 2003.143 The annual compounded growth rate between 1996 and 2000 for this
137 Author's estimate based on data on number of independent retail stores drawn from www.sears.com,
under "/history". Data on average store size drawn from O'Neill and Sutton, 45-48. According to Sears,
there were 150,000 chain stores in the country by 1940 and average size per store was 2,000 square feet
138 City population data drawn from: United States Historical Census Data Browser. See note 128.
139 See "1999 U.S. Retail Sales, Mall Sales, and Department Store Sales," ICSC White Paper, May 1999.
Also see DiPasquale and Wheaton, 274-276.
140 Data on suburban growth drawn from two sources: (1) Samuel R. Staley, '"The Sprawling of America: In
Defense of the Dynamic City," Policy Study No. 251, Reason Public Policy Institute, 1999, and (2) "Source
of Suburban Population Growth: U.S. Urbanized Areas Over 1,000,000, 1950-1990", Demographics Brief,
available at www.demographia.com.
141 Author's estimate based on data from "Mall Openings, 1987-2000: How and Why They've Changed,"
ICSC Research Quarterly Volume 5, Number 2, Summer 1998.
142 See 1990 U.S. Census Estimates at www.census.gov. "Lower-Income" defined as households with less
than 50% of median annual income for 1990.
143 Author's estimate based on data collected from www.webvan.com, www.gateway.com, www.dell.com,
www.cdnow.com, www.amazon.com, www.buy.com www.homegrocer.com, and www.egghead.com. The
average size of a distribution center for each of these firms is 300,000 square feet and the average size of
customer service/fulfillment centers is 150,000 square feet. There are approximately 60 distribution centers
and 20 customer service/fulfillment centers worldwide. In addition, Gateway Country has approximately
500 stores worldwide with an average size of approximately 5,000 square feet per store.
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technology is an astonishing 211%. During this same period, growth in the online buying
population has averaged 208%.144 These findings are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2. Technology Overshooting
Retail Development Technology Estimated Growth of Supply Estimated Growth of Demand
(Life Cycle Horizon) (% per annum) (% per annum)
Independent Development (1900-1940) 7% 4%
Unified Development (1940-2000) 11% 8%
Value Development (1986-2000) 39% 16%
Cyber Development (1996-2000) 211% 208%
What figure 7 graphically illustrates and Table 2 numerically summarizes is the
progression of disruptive retail development technologies. In the early part of the
century, independent development was the dominant paradigm. In the early 1930s,
unified technology captured market growth and displaced independent formats. In the
mid eighties, value technology dominated industry growth and began to challenge unified
formats. And since the mid nineties, cyber development formats have been growing at an
alarming pace, challenging the viability of all other retail development technologies.
Table 2 illustrates that each successive technology has grown at a faster rate than its
predecessor and the marginal growth rate of each new technology has been increasing:
the Unified Development growth rate is about twice the Independent Development
growth rate, the Value Development growth rate is roughly four times the Unified
Development growth rate, and Cyber Development has been growing at roughly five
times the rate of Value Development.
144 Estimate gathered by authors on 8/12/00 from Jupiter Communications, www.jup.com.
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In every instance described above, the established leaders within the dominant
technological paradigm failed to capture the new growth opportunities by continuing to
supply more product than was demanded within the established technology. In the shift
from independent to unified retail, merchant owned stores were displaced with
commercial leases and retailers were effectively driven out of the development business
by emergent unified shopping center developers.145 Since the mid eighties, value
development has been increasingly challenging traditional shopping center formats and
the market leaders in the unified paradigm have retreated up market to super regional
mall formats while lower-tier mall owners are losing business to value developers. 14 6
Despite the recent explosion of online retail, none of the market leaders from within
unified or value technologies have developed cyber retail space, leaving this area of the
business to new specialized firms.'47
While this graphical and numerical data illustrates what happened to retail
development technologies through the twentieth century, it does not explain why this
series of disruptive technologies emerged and how firms that specialized in these
technologies captured market share from established leaders. In order to better
understand the nature of these technologies and describe their impacts on developers,
retailers, and consumers, the history of innovation in retail development is considered
below from the perspective of technology S-curves and value networks.
45 See Buil and Ordway, 22-24.
46 See Beyard, 3-6.
147 See, "E-Commerce is Radically Reshaping Retail Real Estate, According to Urban Land Institute
Experts," ULI Press Release, June 8, 2000. Available at www.uli.org.
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The Era of Independent Retail
From the late seventeenth century to the early nineteenth century, retail
development in America was almost completely dominated by retailers themselves.
Prosperous merchants built their own structures in villages and towns and less
sophisticated retailers operated out of their homes or rented small offices and residences
that were converted to retail use. 14 8 It was not until the middle of the nineteenth century
that regional retail chains began to emerge in densely populated areas within the
Northeast and portions of the Midwest. 14 9 These early retail chains bought land in central
locations within burgeoning cities and constructed their own stores, creating value
networks around them. 50 Figure 8 illustrates an example of a value network from this
period.
Figure 8. Independent Retail Value Network
Independent Retail
Development
- Wnqmn.Ik(r s
R.H. Macy
S.S. Kresge
R.H. Macy
S.S. Kresge
Levi's
Brooks Brothers
1 See Bobbie Kalman, Early Stores and Markets (Crabtree Publishing: Philidelphia, 1981) 21.
14 9 See William Allen Zulker, John Wanamaker: King of Merchants (Eaglecrest Press: Wayne, PA, 1993).
150 O'Neill and Sutton, 11-12.
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As the reader will recall from Chapter 1, value network theory maps the different
levels of product architecture in order to better understand a technological paradigm.' 5 '
The individual components of a value network combine to form a nested commercial
system that defines a firm's competitive strategy.' 5 2 Following Figure 7 from the bottom
up: For independent retail developers, the network was designed to provide quality
brand-name merchandise (bottom level) in a convenient branded retail format that offered
a wide selection (middle level) to an urban and pedestrian consumer constituency (top
level). Separate value networks exist at every level of the network in Figure 7. The
dashed boxes represent the components of these nested value networks. There are two
significant characteristics of this value network. First, retail development was not
geographically differentiated from other types of real estate development. As a result,
stores were constructed in immediate proximity to apartment buildings and professional
buildings.153 Merchants literally located themselves next to their customers to provide
the highest level of convenience that was available in an age when traffic was primarily
pedestrian. Second, the retailers (Wanamaker's, et al.) were also the retail developers -
they adapted the skills and competencies that made them successful in the retail business
into the retail development business. The dimensions of retailing performance (branding,
selection, convenience) shaped the development technology. Stores were constructed as
symbols of the quality and stature of the retailer.' 54 Design and construction were geared
to enhance the retailer's image and attract consumer traffic. 55
151 See Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma, 32-35.
152 Ibid.
153 See Kalman, 22-27.
54 Tedlow, 41.
55 Zulker, Chapter 4.
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Independent development technology was an extremely effective means of
providing goods and services to the urban populations of the early twentieth century. The
growth and prosperity of cities was reflected in the growth and prosperity of retailers,
evidenced by the proliferation of downtown stores. According to an estimate by Sears,
there were 24,000 chain stores in 1914 and more than 150,000 by 1929, just before the
Great Depression.156 Over time, retailers became exceptionally adept at serving the retail
development needs of their core constituencies. Recognizing that urban consumers
tended to cross-shop between different department stores, they began to build their stores
next to one another, clustered in high traffic areas. 57 Continued prosperity led
companies such as Sears, R.H. Macy, S.S. Kresge, Montgomery Ward, Wanamaker, and
F.W. Woolworth to become the largest retail developers and retail real estate owners in
the country before 1945. l58
Suburbanization and Disruptive Unified Technololv
In retrospect, the retailers' superb skill in serving urban consumers proved to be
their downfall as developers from the mid 1940s forward. The population shift away
from urban living to suburban living ushered in the disruptive innovation of unified retail
development. This was a disruptive technology because it introduced a new value
proposition to the market. Suburban consumers found that downtown locations were
poorly suited for their needs - independent development technology resulted in stores
that were too far away from suburban markets.' 59 The essential transition from this
156 See "Sears History" under "/about sears" at www.sears.com.
157 Thus, the development of 'Shopping Streets' and 'Shopping Districts', see Buil and Ordway 22.
158 Zulker, 155.
159 O'Neill and Sutton, 12-14.
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independent type of retail development to a more unified development model began with
the development of Roland Park in Baltimore, Maryland in 1907 and Country Club Plaza
in Kansas City, Missouri in 1922. 160 These prototypical projects brought together the
concepts of downtown shopping districts and neighborhood stores to form 'suburban
shopping districts' that were designed to serve the needs of the growing suburban towns
and villages. Suburban shopping districts were not unlike their downtown predecessors.
Although there was a greater degree of uniformity in design and construction, stores were
still located on main streets in and around town centers.' 6'
It was not until 1931, when Hugh Prather built Highland Park Shopping Village in
Dallas, Texas, that the modem concept of the shopping center was born. This project was
a watershed in retail development - it was the first shopping center to eliminate dedicated
streets and turn itself inward by preventing through traffic, and it was the first shopping
center where "stores were built with a unified image and managed under the control of a
single owner."' 6 2 Thus, Highland Park marked the birth of the retail development firm,
which retained ownership of property and took back rents from retailers. This innovation
separated retailing operations from real estate operations and enabled risk-averse
mainstream retailers, who were comfortably nested in the independent technology value
network. The management teams of these retailers were unable to make a sufficient case
to divert resources away from the large, healthy, and profitable core urban markets to the
small, unpredictable emerging suburban markets. 6 3 By the time that suburban markets
160 Ibid., 15.
161 Ibid., 15.
162 Bul and Ordway quoting ULI's Shopping Center Development Handbook, 22.
163 O'Neill and Sutton, 11-13.
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had grown enough to 'become interesting', development firms using unified technology
had already built an insurmountable advantage in experience and knowledge of these
markets. Figure 9 reflects this transition using the technology S-curve.
Figure 9. Independent to Unified Retail Development
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S-Curve theory postulates that all technologies exhibit diminishing marginal gains
in performance. When a technology is new, even slight improvements and simple
innovations can produce large gains in product performance. Over time, as the
technology matures, product performance begins to flatten out and is replaced by a new
technology or radical innovation. Sustaining technologies are reflected as either
movements along a particular curve (incremental) or shifts to a higher curve (radical).
Disruptive technologies are reflected as shifts in the curve to a new set of axes. In terms
of retail development, technologies are grouped as either disruptive or sustaining based
on whether or not they change the metrics of product performance. A sustaining retail
development technology offers consumers new ways to enjoy existing formats while a
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disruptive retail technology offers consumers a new format that meets their needs in a
way that existing formats cannot or do not.
The transition from independent technologies to unified technologies is
represented as a shift in the S-curve from the left graph to the right graph. Shopping
center developers essentially took basic elements of the independent technology and
adapted them to serve the preferred attributes of suburban consumers.
The Era of Unified Development
In the 1950s and 1960s, hundreds of shopping centers were developed throughout
the country. 164 In addition to significant design innovations such as dedicated parking
lots and retail courtyards, this period saw major operational advances in leasing,
promotions and advertising, maintenance of common areas, and property management. 165
In 1950, the concept of the "mall" was born with the development of Northgate in
Seattle, Washington. Northgate was the first shopping center to have a 40-foot wide
enclosed pedestrian street (called "The Mall" by developer John Graham) with large
department stores at either end to act as "anchors".16 6 The next significant innovation
came shortly thereafter, in 1956, with the development of Southdale Mall in Edina,
Minnesota, the first-ever enclosed shopping center. Shoppers were able to shop during
the bitter Minnesota winter thanks to technological breakthroughs in building roofing and
164 Don Wharton, "Those Amazing Shopping Centers," Readers Digest (Volume 80), Number 481, May
1962, 183.
165 Bul and Ordway, 24.
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heating and air conditioning systems. 16 7 Thus, the modem enclosed regional mall format
was born and the stage was set for tremendous growth. The regional mall proved to be
the dominant format within unified development technology and developers built
regional malls in every major city in America over the next two decades. 168
By the mid-70s, there were approximately 15,000 shopping centers and 1,000
enclosed malls in the United States.169 Starting in 1975, the regional mall was adapted
into several new and exciting formats by several visionary and imaginative developers.
The retail concept was expanded to include entertainment with formats such as the
festival market and the specialty center, which were developed by Rouse Company in
historic sites like Faniuel Hall in Boston, South Street Seaport in Manhattan, and Pier 39
in San Francisco. 170 In 1981, Triple Five Corporation developed the mammoth West
Edmonton Mall, a 5.2 million square foot mall that ushered in the era of the 'super
regional mall'. West Edmonton redefined the concept of the mall with its tremendous
drawing power - eight anchors, a 400,000 square foot amusement park, and a 355-room
hotel.' 7 ' These innovations were sustaining because they improved the performance of
established formats along the dimensions of performance that mainstream customers in
major suburban markets had historically valued (reflected on the right hand graph in
Figure 9). Suburban retail development came to be dominated by firms that learned to
master the 'shopping center technology'. As they climbed the experience curve, mall
166 See Paul Doocey, "12 Who Dared to be Bolder, Brighter, Better," Shopping Centers Today, May 1991,
46. Graham's use of the term "mall" was the first ever recorded use of the word within a retail context.
167 Doocey, 47.
168 See Doocey, 60.
169 Author's estimate based on data drawn from ICSC website, www.icsc.org, under "/research".
170 See Doocey, 63.
171 Ibid.
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developers made new discoveries about location strategies, consumer demographic
metrics, tenant-mix strategies, design formats, construction methods, and entertainment
retail. This is represented as the flattening-out of the upper curve on the right hand graph
in Figure 8. Almost every single market leading development firm in the unified
shopping center business was founded between 1950 and 1965.172 These firms rode the
wave of unified technology to the top of their respective markets by building strong value
networks with department store retailers and suburban consumers. Figure 10 presents an
example of one such value network.
Figure 10. Unified Development Value Network
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172 Melvin Simon & Associates, The Edward J. Debartolo Company, JMB Incorporated, General Growth
Properties, Kimco, Hahn Development, Rouse, to name a few.
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The unified technology value network is a highly specialized system geared to
serve the diverse needs of suburban consumer constituencies. Different firms populate
each level of the network, unlike the independent value network. In this system, the
development firm identifies a location that meets the market requirements of the
department store, which serves as 'anchor' in the eventual shopping center. The
developer builds the store for the anchor and generally charges a very reasonable rent,
relying on the anchor to draw consumer traffic to the mall. Based on the level of
consumer traffic, the developer is then able to charge relatively high levels of rent to
smaller 'satellite' tenants (typically selling full-price fashion apparel) that do not have the
drawing power of national department stores. 173 Thus, in this value network, the
developer has a major incentive to generate mall traffic. This is achieved by offering
consumers the widest possible array of retailers (including food and entertainment
retailers) in a pleasant and safe climate-controlled atmosphere.
The growth of suburban populations has propelled unified developers to huge
heights. They have made large strides in improving the shopping center experience.
Firmly ensconced in their value networks, they continue surging up market within the
unified paradigm by offering larger malls, more conventional retailers, more
entertainment formats and more food retailers. 174 This has opened the door for disruptive
value development technologies such as power centers and outlet malls, which have
segmented consumer markets and specialized in value market niches.
173 See W. Wheaton and R. Torto, "Shopping Center Economics," Working Paper, June 1993.
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Market Segmentation and Disruptive Value Technologies
With the growth of community centers and regional shopping centers from the
1930s to the 1960s, came the growth of grocery-anchored shopping centers. The
supermarket concept was invented in the 1930s and most of the leading supermarket
chains of today were founded before 1960.175 Grocery-anchored shopping center
development was a disruptive technology from the perspective of existing suburban retail
formats because it brought a new value proposition to suburban consumers. Because
supermarkets dealt in commodity items, shoppers were looking for a fast, simple, and
convenient way to purchase their goods and take them home. Grocery-anchored centers
were simple in design and cheap in construction - this technology was not about creating
a mall that draws people for a pleasurable shopping experience. This is reflected in
Figure 11 below as a shift from the left-hand curve to the right hand curve.
Figure 11. Unified to Value Retail Development
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174 See "'Mall Openings, 1987-2000: How and Why They've Changed," ICSC Research Quarterly Volume
5, Number 2, Summer 1998.
175 See Tedlow, chapter 3.
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In response to the explosion of discount retailing from the early 1960s forward,
the grocery-anchored format was adapted to discount-anchored centers. This was an
incremental innovation since it did not involve a major change in development
technology - discount-anchored shopping centers looked almost exactly the same as their
predecessors. Refer to figure 11, where the discount-retail format is represented as a
move along the technology curve. In the mid-1980s, this format was expanded radically
into power center technology, which consisted of massive structures that resembled
warehouses. The power center format enhanced the attributes by which its predecessors
were judged - larger parking lot, more efficient shopping experience, better and more
direct access to value retailers. This innovation is represented as an upward shift on the
right hand curve in Figure 11. The power center was followed with the outlet center,
which took the technology to its logical extreme, enticing shoppers to travel long
distances from their homes in order to find a bargain. The market leaders in the unified
technology did not build a business based on value technology primarily because (1)
margins in value development are significantly lower than in other shopping center
formats, and (2) the firm-level cost structure required for competition in the value arena
effectively priced mall developers out of the market. 176
The Era of Value Retail Development
Value development technology is unique in its low construction, operational, and
maintenance costs. 177 The emphasis in value development is providing consumers with
efficient access to two types of tenants: warehouse-type general merchandise discount
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176 See Beyard, 1-3.
177 Ibid., 4.
retailers, and category-killer specialized discount retailers.' 7 8 In fact, value technology
was initiated through the desire of large-format discount firms such as Target and Wal-
Mart to penetrate lower-income suburban markets.179 A value development is a super
community shopping center in which at least 75 to 90 percent of the selling space is
devoted to multiple off-price, category-focused anchors and a discount department store
or warehouse club.' 80 An example of this technology's value network is illustrated in
Figure 12 below.
Figure 12. Value Development Value Network
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The emphasis of this technology on price and efficiency is strongly reflected in
the value network from the bottom up. The discount retailer provides relatively simple
178 Ibid. 'Category-killers' are retailers such as Office Depot, Toys R Us, Michaels, and Petco, that offer a
wide range of merchandise within narrowly defined retail categories such as toys, office supplies, etc.
179 Beyard, 2.
18 0 Definition paraphrased from International Council of Shopping Centers. See "Shopping Center
Definitions," at www.icsc.com under "/research".
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and low-cost merchandise, such as discount apparel (bottom level), to the price conscious
consumer. The merchandising format and organization of a discount retail store is geared
around providing access to these goods as directly as possible (middle level). Unlike
conventional merchants, which rely on intricate displays, strategic lighting, and
experienced salespeople, discount merchants focus exclusively on the products
themselves, with very few frills and even fewer salespeople. 81' Value technology
capitalizes on societal trends toward cost-consciousness, time constraints, and
informality. This 'no-frills' approach is translated up into the design and construction of
the power center (top level). Value developments, with their emphasis on simple design
and low-cost construction, resemble industrial buildings more than they do malls.
Construction of these centers are being driven less by overall retail demand and more by
the retailers themselves who are exploiting an imbalance in the type of retail formats and
price points that consumers want. In addition, the corporate strategies of these retailers
are focused on relentlessly growing their businesses at the expense of their
competitors.182 This trend is reflected back in Table 2, where there is a sizeable 23% gap
between growth in supply and growth in demand for value development.
Recent studies reveal that value development technology has begun marching up
into the unified development market. According to research conducted by the
International Council of Shopping Centers, "power centers are growing more popular
with the public and are becoming formidable competitors with malls." 183 The logic
181 See Donald Ziccardi and David Moin, Masterminding the Store (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1997)
40-55.
182 Beyard, 7.
183 See "Power Center Cross-Shopping," ICSC Research Quarterly Volume 3, Number 3, Fall 1996, 3.
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behind this trend is that (1) value developments are beginning to incorporate
entertainment retail, food retail, and other formats that used to be constricted to unified
technology, and (2) fewer mainstream retailers are willing to pay the relatively high
occupancy costs related to mall tenancy. 184 According to the Department of Commerce,
since 1990, the retailers in the value development technology value network, such as
discount warehouses, home improvement centers, and electronics stores have registered
90% of the growth in mall-oriented retail sales.185 Disruptive technology theory would
predict that this trend will continue and value development will capture an increasingly
larger portion of every consumer dollar spent on retail.
In addition to driving the continued success of value retail development
technology, consumer demand for low-cost, efficient, and convenient access to retailers
has propelled the growth of online retail and cyber retail development technology.
The Emergence of Cyber Retail Development
Starting in the mid 1990s, the World Wide Web has emerged as a powerful new
medium to sell products and services. With the explosive growth and widespread
popularity of the Internet among all generations of Americans, a few ingenious
individuals recognized the opportunity to reach a large and growing audience of potential
consumers. Early entrants to the online retail business such as Amazon.com and
Gateway.com, focused on merchandising products that consumers "already know" and
'84 Ibid.
185 See U.S. Commerce Department Data quoted in, "1999 U.S. Retail Sales, Mall Sales, Department Stores
Sales Review," ICSC White Paper Spring 2000.
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"can define exactly what they want", such as books and computers. 186 The initial
financial success and fundamental growth of these companies fueled the proliferation of
literally hundreds of new online retailers, offering an extremely broad range of products
and services.18 7 This growth in the online market has affected every area of the real
estate industry (as discussed in Chapter 2), but no single area has received as much media
attention as the retail development business.' 88 The logic behind the focus on retail
development is that (1) online retail is changing the way consumers purchase goods and
services, (2) new consumption patterns do not require physical contact with retailers, and
(3) this removes the necessity for retail development.l8 9
While it is true that online retail does change the way consumers interact with
retailers, there has been little evidence since 1996 that consumers perceive online retail as
a substitute for physical stores. Current research suggests that consumers treat online
retail as a complement to conventional retail with shopping center tenants reporting that
the number of Internet-researched purchases made at conventional stores exceeds online
purchases by a factor of about five to one.' 90 But the growth of cyber retail development
cannot and should not be ignored. Compared with the other three technological
paradigms discussed in this chapter, cyber development has grown geometrically faster in
its early phase than any other retail development technology. Fueled by explosive
demand for cyber development technologies, a few firms with relatively little prior
186 See "Nonstore Retailing: Implications of the Internet," ICSC Research Quarterly Volume 3, Number 3,
Fall 1996, 9.
187 See "Online Shopping" section on Ziff-Davis website, www.zdnet.com.
188 See "Shopping Center Web Sites," ICSC Research Quarterly Volume 6, Number 2, Summer 1999, 2.
189 Ibid., 4-7.
190 See "Shopping Center Web Sites," 5.
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experience in retail development are leading the charge of cyber development. Figure 13
characterizes the origin of cyber retail development.
Figure 13. Value to Cyber Retail Development
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Cyber development can be represented as a rightward shift in the value
technology S-curve. This is for two reasons: (1) cyber retail development draws on many
of the attributes that characterize value technologies, and (2) cyber retailers mostly traffic
in the same goods (i.e. hard goods, books, electronics) as value retailers. Just as in value
development, the emphasis in cyber development is to build retail environments that
maximize the efficiency and convenience of the shopping experience. Virtual stores, the
first instance of a cyber technology, were actually popularized within value centers across
the country by Gateway 2000, a leading national computer retailer. 191 The typical
191 For more information on the origins of virtual stores, see Gateway's 1996 Annual Report, available
online at www.gateway.com.
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"Gateway Country" store consists of a showroom filled with the most popular items in
the Gateway product line. Consumers enter the store and interact with the products just
as they would in a conventional store. Customer representatives assist potential shoppers
and answer any questions that may arise. When the customer has decided on the specific
product attributes that are most appealing, he or she is invited to a terminal where the
salesperson takes the order for a customized computer with those attributes and
instantaneously sends it to the central network that Gateway uses to manage its supply
chain. The 'perfect' computer is then delivered to the customer within a week. 192 From a
development perspective, this type of retail is disruptive for two reasons. First, there is
very little space devoted in the store to inventory - the store is essentially a showroom
from which the customer chooses the attributes for their customized product. Second, the
store is physically connected by cables and wires to an ultra high-speed network that
connects the store to the distribution facility and the manufacturing plant. These two
characteristics have the potential to change the dimensions along which customers value
retail development. Namely, in the virtual store technology, the customer values the
ability to browse among different products, physically interact with those products, get
answers to their questions about the products, and leave the store with a customized
product. 193
A second, more radical variant of cyber development technology is the 'invisible
store'. 94 This technology was first used in 1996 by Amazon.com, the leading online
bookseller. From a development perspective, this technology is closer to industrial
192Description based on author's experience at Gateway Country Store in Glendale, CA 7/14/00.
193 See "Gateway Country," on the web at www.gateway.com.
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development than it is to retail development. In this model, the consumer never makes
physical contact with the product they purchase until it arrives by mail. Questions or
comments are directed to a customer service network (available 24 hours a day, 7 days a
week) that handles all consumer issues. This system essentially eliminates the need for
the physical store and replaces it with distribution facilities and customer service
facilities. An example of a cyber development technology value network is represented
in Figure 14.
Figure 14. Cyber Development Value Network
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The cyber development value network is designed to maximize convenience and
efficiency for the consumer. 19 5 The vast majority of online purchases are made by
consumers who can identify exactly which product attributes they desire. In other words,
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there are no salespeople in cyberspace and as a result, most purchases are well researched
(lower level). The online retailer adds value by providing a format that enables the
consumer to access the store at any time and from any place, provided they have access
to a digital network (middle level). The need for convenience and efficiency is translated
into the upper level of the network, where developers build highly automated distribution
centers (efficiency) located near airports (convenience) that enable the retailers to get
their products to consumers as quickly as possible. The core competencies that are
required to develop distribution centers are fundamentally different from those of other
retail development technologies and as a result, highly specialized development firms
dominate this area of the business. While the size of the online retail market and
subsequently, the size of the cyber development market, are currently very small
compared to the established technologies, the growth rates suggest that over the next five
years, this gap will close very fast.196
Established Market Responses
Conventional retail developers were initially slow to respond to the growth of
cyber development technologies, but have begun to focus an increasing amount of
resources on exploring the nature of online retail. Within the industry, the established
leaders currently fall into two camps: those who choose to fight cyber technologies and
those who choose to embrace them. Predictably, the opponents of cyber technologies
continually argue that the online market is 'too small to worry about', and have led the
vigorous campaign to tax all purchases made on the Internet, hoping to curb the growth
95
"e-Commerce", ICSC White Paper, Spring 2000, 4.
196 Ibid., 5-8.
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of online retail and 'level the playing field' for conventional retailers.' 9 7 The proponents
of cyber technologies are struggling to understand the future of cyber development and
have invested a large amount of resources in Internet-related technologies.
In order to better understand the impact of innovation in retail development, it is
helpful to consider disruptive technologies from a firm level perspective. In the next
chapter, we consider the strategy of Simon Property Group, the leading firm of unified
development, and a strong proponent of cyber development technologies.
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197 Ibid., 1.
Chapter 4. Firm-Level Strategy - Simon Property Group
If longevity, firm size, and firm profitability are indicators of success, the Simon
Property Group having been in business over 40 years, owning over 180 million square
feet of retail space, and with a $17 billion market cap could be considered a successful
firm. 198 Could a major factor in the Simon Property Group's success be their ability to
manage both sustaining and disruptive innovations? This chapter discusses Simon's
major technology initiatives. The goal is to build upon the analysis from the last chapter
and apply some of the lessons about innovation in the real estate industry. The analysis
begins with a brief overview of the firm and proceeds with an account of the firm's
technology strategy.
Simon Property Group History19 9
Melvin Simon and Associates was founded in 1960, shortly after the advent of the
enclosed regional mall. The firm began by developing both community shopping centers
and regional malls throughout the Midwest in the seventies and eighties. By 1990, it was
one of the largest regional retail development firms in the country. In the early nineties,
Simon merged with the Edward J. Debartolo Company to form the nation's largest retail
development firm. Simon-Debartolo went public in 1993 and began an aggressive
campaign of purchasing existing shopping centers and malls from smaller competitors.
Simon-Debartolo led the shopping center industry in the national consolidation phase of
the mid-90s. In 1998, the firm was renamed Simon Property Group. As of June 30,
198 For more historical information on the Simon Property Group, see www.about.simon.com. Market cap
rate was as of 6/30/2000.
82
2000, the company owned or had an interest in 253 properties comprising regional malls,
community shopping centers and specialty and mixed-use properties containing 184
million square feet of gross leasable area (GLA) in 36 states and five assets in Europe.
Simon Property Group, Inc., together with its affiliated management company, owns or
manages approximately 190 million square feet of GLA in retail and mixed-use projects
and attracts over 2 billion shopping visits annually to its properties
Simon is comfortably nested in the shopping center/mall value network that it
helped to create. The firm has truly mastered mall technology and introduced several
sustaining innovations that have become integral to the modem notion of the mall. Some
examples of these innovations include advanced customer research, retail food courts,
category clusters, kiosks, and direct mail advertising. It is not an understatement to say
that Simon has helped retailers understand and interact with their consumers more
effectively. Along with a few other leading firms, Simon has pushed mall technology to
new heights.
Simon's Innovations
However, the Simon Property Group has, during the first half of 2000, looked
outside of their existing value network to explore innovations that could further add value
to the firm. Simon turned their attention to exploring potentially disruptive innovations
that would service the new economy. One Simon marketing manager stated,
"The reality facing Simon is that the potential for
improvements in mall technology is almost fully realized. Mall
formats have converged - it is very difficult for consumers to
199 Information gathered from www.shopsimon.com, Simon Property Group's website, 7/22/2000.
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distinguish between malls because they are all beginning to look
alike. In order to be competitive in the new economy we need to
be willing to take chances on technologies that will potentially
change the way the industry operates." 200
Although still committed to improving their existing retail models through sustaining
innovation, Simon's management team is cognizant of the fact that the time is ripe for
new disruptive retail technologies.201 Therefore, Simon adopted a two-prong value
network. The first focusing on Simon's traditional retail business and the sustaining
technologies that support it, and the second focusing on potentially disruptive
innovations, which are managed by Simon subsidiaries. The following is an account of
Simon's technological initiatives during 1999 and 2000:202
* www.merchantwired.com
Description: Merchantwired bills itself as the "Net Power for the
Bricks and Mortar World".20 3 Merchantwired.com promises to
provide a complete end-to-end solution that will help retailers
streamline back-office operations, while adding great opportunities
at the point of sale. The result is a coast-to-coast extranet that
provides high speed, low cost online access, a revolutionary new
network for the retail industry, local networks within each Simon
mall, a national link of Simon stores and properties, and a
200 Statement made by Simon Property Group marketing manager interviewed in person by Andre
Navasargian, 5/23/2000.
201 Opinions gathered from interviews, conducted in person by Andre Navasargian, with 3 Simon
employees, 5/23/2000-5/25/2000.
202 What follows is a brief analysis of their major strategic policies from the perspective of disruptive
technologies. This information was primarily gathered from the media, Simon's promotional literature, and
the Internet. Simon representatives were contacted for further comment, but declined to divulge specific
information other than that which is available publicly.
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connection for all retail operations from manufacturing through
distribution and human resources.
Analysis: Merchantwired.com has been a boost to Simon's brick
and mortar retail model. Simon was the first to establish a
portfolio-wide extranet that allows each retailer to access a
multitude of enhanced services. We believe the
merchantwired.com technology to be sustaining as it hasn't
changed, but has enhanced the existing model by creating more
efficient operational processes.
* Operation Resourcenet
Description: This technology is an electronic marketplace for
retailers, vendors, businesses, and mall owners. It essentially
leverages the collective buying power of its members to obtain
lower prices, improved services, and higher-quality products.
Analysis: Resourcenet is another sustaining technology. The
technology has not changed the retail business model, but it has
presented the opportunity for more cost effective operation of
business. Similar to merchantwired.com, resourcenet further
strengthens Simon's brick and mortar retail model by offering
value added services to its retailers.
203 For more information visit www.merchantwired.com.
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· www.shopsimon.com
Description: This is Simon's primary presence on the Internet.
The website offers consumers a searchable list of malls and stores,
printable mall maps and driving directions, links to virtual
storefronts, links to retailer websites, purchase of gift certificates,
and information on mall promotions.
Analysis: Shopsimon.com is a sustaining technology. It is
designed to stimulate additional traffic from mainstream
consumers within the existing performance paradigm. In other
words, this technology does not offer consumers a new set of
reasons to come to malls.
· MALLPerks
Description: MALLPerks is a national shopper loyalty program
with more than two million members. Consumers can enroll for
this free service online by entering some personal information.
Upon enrollment, consumers receive a card that is used to track the
client's spending pattern. Shoppers earn points for every dollar
they spend at any of Simon's 250 malls. These points can then be
exchanged for goods and services.
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Analysis: This program is a clever sustaining technology. It is
designed with two objectives: (1) to get mall shoppers to spend
more at Simon properties by offering incentives, based on
spending, to those that shop at Simon properties, and (2) to provide
detailed demographic and spending pattern information on mall
shoppers. The system is designed to squeeze more performance
out of existing mainstream mall technologies.
* Simon Branding
Description: Starting in 1999, Simon launched an effort to promote
the firm as a unique brand. According to their promotional
literature, over one half of shoppers surveyed know the Simon
name and understand the Simon brand. Specific branding
strategies include direct mail advertising, embedding the "Simon"
name within the mall's name, standardization of design elements,
and the publication of S Magazine - a partnership with Time Inc.
that is distributed to shoppers.
Analysis: This is another clever sustaining technology that does
not extend the market reach beyond mainstream mall shoppers.
The development of a Simon brand does not really bring the
market a new value proposition. Branding technology has
historically been used to market easily substituted, commodity-
87
type products such as soap or cheese. Branding shopping malls
can be thought of as a strategy in response to the market reality
that mall technology is converging and the s-curve is beginning to
flatten.
* www.fastfrog.com
Description: Teens can use FastFrog.com both online and at the
mall. 204 To use FastFrog.com, a teen simply registers at the "Frog
Pond" (a FastFrog kiosk in a mall) or online at FastFrog.com. Once
registered, a teen can check out a "zapstick" from the in-mall kiosk
and scan items they like at participating retailers to add them to
their wish list. Teens can log onto the FastFrog.com website and
access their wishlists and add items to their wishlists online.
Once a teen has created a wishlist, the
emailed, printed out, or the teen's parents
FastFrog.com kiosk in the mall where the Frog
print the wishlist for them.
Analysis: This is a
departure from the
technology will allow
wishlist can be
can visit the
Pond staff will
potentially disruptive technology as it's a
traditional shopping experience. The
teen shoppers to combine both physical and
204 See www.fastfrog.com for more information.
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virtual shopping models. The process may change the way in
which products are displayed, marketed, purchased, and delivered.
* www.yoursherpa.com
Description: Not unlike FastFrog.com, YourSherpa.com uses
hand-held and online technology to help time-constrained
consumers shop efficiently when and where they want.205 The hand
held technology, in the form of a "ruggedized" Palm Pilot PDA
(personal digital assistant) with a barcode scanner, allows adults to
shop simply and quickly by scanning items they want from favorite
retailers, pay through a single channel, and have those items
conveniently delivered, avoiding the hassle of checkout lines.
Consumers can use YourSherpa.com in two ways, online
and in the mall. To use YourSherpa.com, a consumer can either
register online at the YourSherpa.com website, or at a
YourSherpa.com kiosk in a mall. When a consumer registers, a
customer account is created which can be accessed either via the
Internet or using a YourSherpa.com PDA.
To use YourSherpa.com in a mall, registered users of
YourSherpa.com check out a PDA from the YourSherpa.com
kiosk. The PDA has a built-in barcode scanner and utilizes the
Palm Operating System. Registered YourSherpa.com users can
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then go into participating retailers and scan the items they want to
purchase immediately and the items they would like to purchase
later. When the consumer is done shopping he or she returns the
PDA to the YourSherpa.com kiosk and the items that have been
scanned are uploaded to the consumer's personal YourSherpa.com
website. The purchased items are then fulfilled for the consumer
and YourSherpa.com arranges with the consumer when and where
they want their purchases delivered.
To use YourSherpa.com online, a registered user simply
logs into YourSherpa.com on the Internet. Once logged on a
consumer can shop on the website like any traditional online
shopping website. Additionally, the consumer can also review
items scanned previously in the mall and purchase those items over
the Internet.
Analysis: YourSherpa.com is also a potentially disruptive
technology. The technology offers a new shopping option,
allowing consumers to efficiently and expeditiously purchase their
retail items. The technology may also alter retailer's current
business models to accommodate this new wave of consumers.
205 See www.yoursherpa.com for more information.
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* Simon Live Media Network
Description: Simon's partnership with Turner Broadcasting System
to produce a private in-mall retail entertainment network consisting
of a televised network that will broadcast mall events, live
entertainment and informational events targeted to consumers,
interactive media stations within the mall, and a family zone that
includes gaming, animated programming, and retail offerings.
Analysis: This is a disruptive technology because it involves
creating a totally unique marketing medium. The mall is
transformed into live media. The entertainment/retail/media
hybrid model offers a new forum for both retailers and consumers
to buy and sell goods. The innovation will require a new type of
retail space and new method of product presentation. Further, the
consumers shopping experience will change drastically as they are
engulfed in an interactive, entertainment-based retail experience.
The following represents a sampling of Simon's expanded innovations (Figure.
15). Note that although the sustaining innovations outweigh the disruptive innovations in
the diagram, this is only the beginning of Simon's initiatives to develop disruptive
innovations. They currently have a number of new, potentially disruptive initiatives
underway.206
206 For more information on the Simon Property Groups current technological initiatives, see
www.about. simon.com.
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Sustaining
Innovations
Merchantwired.com
-Portfolio-wide
extranet.
Resourcenet-
Collective buying
power.
Disruptive
Innovations
FastFrog.com-
Virtual/Physical
shopping model.
In their efforts to capitalize on disruptive technologies, the Simon Property Group
quickly learned that the exploration of innovations outside of your existing value network
could be viewed as threatening to those operating within the network and those that the
network services.207 Therefore, Simon took steps to create a system that would allow the
firm to pursue both sustaining and disruptive technologies. The group spearheading the
development of sustaining innovations would continue to operate as The Simon Property
Group, while smaller, subsidiary groups would be formed to develop/test potentially
207 Opinions gathered from interviews, conducted in person by Andre Navasargian, with 3 Simon
employees, 5/23-5/25.
92
Figure 15. The
Simon Property
Group's Expanded
'Ja1 1 0 NVQ zXr 7L1- 1
ShopSimon.com-
Simon's virtual
retail portal.
YourSherpa.com-
Virtual/Physical
shopping model.
MALLPerks-
Shopper loyalty
program.
Simon Live Media
Network-
Media/Retail model.
Simon Branding-
Shopping mall
branding.
I V ItM . 4%, % VV K i
disruptive technologies.20 8 Simon's approach is consistent with the theory that smaller
groups with flexible value networks may have an easier time developing and introducing
disruptive innovations into the market place.
Further underlining their commitment to the development of sustaining and disruptive
innovations, Simon has joined forces with some of the country's largest property owners,
Equity Office and Equity Residential, "to form a company that will search out, establish
and incubate web-based and electronic-commerce businesses that will target the millions
of people who walk through their properties every week." 209 The group is Constellation
and it acts as safe alternative for Simon to invest in potentially disruptive technologies. It
creates an independent organization that has the flexibility to chase small emerging
markets with disruptive innovations.
The Simon Property Group has stated their commitment to pursuing the development
of both sustaining and disruptive developments. They have also experienced the
complexities of exploring potentially disruptive innovations within an established value
network. As a result, they have created a business strategy that includes a two-prong
value network. The first focusing on the development of sustaining technologies,
managed by The Simon Property Group proper; and the second focusing on the
development/testing of or investment in potentially disruptive technologies, managed by
Simon subsidiaries or third parties such as Constellation. To date, Simon has created 4
2 08 Clixnmortar.com, FastFrog.com, YourSherpa.com, and the Simon Live Media Network are all
subsidiaries of the Simon Property Group and were established to develop/test potentially disruptive
innovations.
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subsidiaries to spearhead these potentially disruptive initiatives. 210 This new strategy
coupled with Simon's allocation of human and financial capital to the initiatives has
established Simon as one of the drivers of innovation within the industry.
Again, it is likely that the Simon Property Group has experienced sustained growth
and profitability, in part, as a result of their effective management of innovation. First,
they have pursued the development of innovations that the market may not be ready for
with the understanding that the time may come when the market is ready for the
innovations. Second, they have allocated the necessary resources to the development of
disruptive innovations. Third, they have empowered subsidiary groups to spearhead their
disruptive initiatives with the understanding that these smaller groups with flexible value
networks are more likely to have success in developing disruptive innovations. Finally,
they have looked to introduce their disruptive innovations in emerging markets with the
understanding that these markets are more likely to embrace the new innovations than an
established market. The combination of the above factors may very well provide the
Simon Property Group with the edge they need to continue to grow their market share
and profitability.
The final chapter will recap the frameworks and theories presented in the previous
chapters and offer suggestions to effectively manage innovation in the real estate
industry.
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209 See Barbara Martinez, "Big Property Owners Team Up for E-Commerce," The Wall Street Journal, May
4, 2000, A3.
210 See www.about.simon.com for more information concerning Simon subsidiaries.
Conclusion
Innovation in all shapes and forms will continue to revolutionize the real estate
industry. By applying analytical frameworks (developed through the study of other
industries) to the real estate industry at varying levels, we hoped to learn more about the
nature of innovation and its impact on the real estate industry. In the end, what do real
estate managers learn from this study and what are the steps they should take to
successfully manage innovation in the real estate industry? The research suggests the
following:
First, innovation impacts both high technology and low technology industries alike.
The theory of disruptive technologies suggests that certain innovations that bring new
value propositions to market have the ability to fundamentally reshape the competitive
landscape within an industry. The technology S-curve and the value network are shown
to be especially useful tools in understanding how and why some technologies change
industries while others serve to strengthen the positions of established leaders. The
theory has been proven in high-tech industries such as the disk drive industry and in low-
tech industries such as the construction industry. Each of these industries, as indicated in
the study, has experienced a shift in their S-Curves as a result of disruptive innovation.
Second, these disruptive innovations tend to be simple innovations that make
life/work easier. Disruptive innovations are, for the most part, innovations that make
processes more effective and efficient. For example, the idea of an online real estate
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exchange, such as Zethus, is a fairly simple model. It essentially creates the opportunity
for property to be bought and sold online. Despite the simplistic nature of the model, the
innovation is disruptive as it simplifies a process that is traditionally complex.
Third, small groups with flexible value networks have historically had a more
successful time of developing disruptive innovation. These small groups have an
advantage over established firms, as they are able to focus solely on the development of
the disruptive innovation. Further, disruptive innovation usually appears threatening to
existing value networks. The small groups are usually still in the process of establishing
their value networks and, therefore, the development of disruptive innovation doesn't
usually pose a threat to their still evolving value networks.
Fourth, emerging markets tend to be more receptive to disruptive innovations. Just
like established firms, established markets have existing value networks. These markets
are often wary of looking at innovations that lie outside of their value networks. The
solution is to focus on emerging markets when developing or testing disruptive
innovations. These markets are still in the process of establishing their value networks
and are much more likely to evaluate disruptive innovation.
Finally, in order to stay competitive in the new economy, real estate managers must
have a value network that includes both sustaining and disruptive initiatives. It is
imperative that firms continue to pursue sustaining innovation that will bolster their
existing models. It is equally important for these firms to incorporate the development of
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disruptive innovation into their value networks to service emerging markets and
capitalize on potential opportunities created by shifts in the industry S-Curves.
A savvy real estate manager should consider the following when creating a
business model to manage disruptive innovation:
1. Pursue innovation outside of existing value networks. Innovation that
may not appear to be useful to markets today may directly address their
needs tomorrow. Therefore, it is imperative that a firm look outside their
existing value network when pursuing the development of disruptive
innovation.
2. Resources are necessary to successfully develop disruptive
innovations. There is a direct correlation between the success of
managing innovation and resource allocation. Innovation proposals that
get the funding and manpower they require may succeed; those given
lower priority, whether formally or de facto, will starve for lack of
resources and have little chance of success. Firms must allocate the
necessary human and financial resources to their disruptive initiatives if
they are to succeed.
3. Matching the market to the technology is not an easy task. Successful
companies have a practiced ability in taking sustaining technologies to
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market, routinely giving their customers more and better versions of what
they say they want [e.g., SHOPPING CENTERS REGIONAL MALLS
- ENCLOSED MALLS SUPER REGIONAL MALLS]. But this does
not work when handling disruptive technologies. If a company forces a
disruptive technology to fit the needs of an established market, it is almost
sure to fail. The successful firm will find a new or emerging market that
values the attributes of the disruptive innovations. "Disruptive technology
is a marketing challenge, not a technological challenge".2 1 1
4. A subsidiary should be created to spearhead disruptive initiatives.
Our study indicates that an independent subsidiary or third party should
spearhead the development of all disruptive innovations. The group
should be formed with flexible value networks allowing for the focused
pursuit of the development of disruptive innovations. These groups
should be empowered to develop outside of current market value networks
with the hope of developing an innovation that will one day be deemed
essential by the existing markets.
In addition to sound business practices, managers can surmount the complexities
associated with disruptive innovation and capitalize on the benefits that accompany them
by exploring innovation outside of their existing value networks, supporting the
development of potentially disruptive innovations with the necessary human and capital
resources, identifying emerging markets that may be receptive to the disruptive
211 Taken from Clayton Christensen's Innovator's Dilemma, page 208.
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innovations, and empowering a focused and flexible entity to spearhead the development
of the potentially disruptive innovation.
Despite the suggestions for managing innovation in the real estate industry, this
study raises more questions than it answers. For example, where can managers turn for
the information required to make large and decisive investments in the face of disruptive
technology? The information simply does not exist in an assessable, inexpensive, and
flexible forum.
Second, the barriers to entry in terms of successfully developing and introducing
disruptive innovations are difficult to calculate. Despite their endowments in technology,
brand names, management experience, relationship with tenants, and just plain cash,
successful real estate companies populated by good managers have a genuinely hard time
doing what does not fit into their existing value networks. Because disruptive
technologies rarely make sense during the years when investing in them is most
important, conventional managerial wisdom at established firms constitutes an entry
barrier that entrepreneurs and investors can bank on.
In order to fully understand the complexities of disruptive innovations and the
proper way to manage disruptive initiatives, firms must make the necessary investment
into further research on the topic. Each market and sub-group within the real estate
industry is highly complex and unique. Using the theories and analytical frameworks
presented, firms must identify the potential for disruptive innovation within their specific
industries. Those firms that successfully develop and manage the complexities of
99
disruptive innovation will potentially increase their competitive advantage, increase their
market share, and subsequently add value to their bottom lines. The opportunities
associated with disruptive innovation are endless.
"The Internet is a mechanism that will revolutionize the Real Estate Industry
by solidifying its competitive edge, enhancing its business processes and
business solutions and increasing its return on investments. The power of the
digital economy is infinite."212
212 Comment made by Forbes Magazine in preparation for the "E-Business in the Construction Industry"
conference sponsored by Forbes, Bentley Systems, Cephren, Pricewaterhousecoopers, Primavera. For
more information concerning the conference or the press release, see www.cephren.com/about/press,
3/21/2000.
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